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The Struggle for the Child*: Preserving the Family in
Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third
Parties
On August 2, 1993, most of the country watched the dramatic transfer
of a little girl screaming for her "mommy," as Baby Jessica was taken from
the only parents she had ever known and returned to the biological parents
she had never met. As the event was broadcast throughout the nation, the
plight of Baby Jessica and the couples who fought over her created a public
outcry for reform of adoption law and greater recognition of children's
rights. Baby Jessica's case has been called the "outrage of the decade"'
and the "Dred Scott of our time."2 Children in situations like Jessica's are
now being called "Solomon's children."3
In the past year, the rash of cases involving custody disputes between
biological parents and third parties has prompted both sociologists and legal
scholars to return to the nature-nurture debate and to question what consti-
tutes a family. Should society, and thus the legal system, strive to preserve
the biological family by preferring the rights of natural parents over those
of anyone else? Should the goal be to protect third parties' interests in the
* This struggle exists at several different levels. First, because children often do not have a
voice in our legal system, parents and other adults are the ones responsible for protecting their
interests. In custody disputes, however, the struggle often becomes one over the child, in what
may be viewed as a legal tug-of-war. Additionally, the state, which has an interest in protecting
the child, is in the precarious position of enacting laws designed to prevent or facilitate these
battles. Finally, and most important, the struggle is that of the child, whose stability and welfare
are inevitably affected.
1. Mona Charen, CNN Capital Gang, Custody Battles Over Jessica and Kimberly (CNN
television broadcast, Aug. 7, 1993) (Transcript # 85-3).
2. Id.
3. There have been numerous legal and media references to the biblical story of King Solo-
mon's decision to award a child to a mother who, rather than see her child split in two, urged him
to give the child to the other woman. See, e.g., Robert E. Shepherd Jr., Solomon's Sword: Adjudi-
cation of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RiCH. L. REv. 151, 151 (1974); Note, Natural vs. Adop-
tive Parents: Divided Children and the Wisdom of Solomon, 57 IowA L. REv. 171, 180, 193-98
(1971); Sally Johnson, Adoption's Tangled Web, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A13; William
Raspberry, Is It Really Wisdom When Babies-And Hearts-Are Torn in Two?, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 6, 1993, at A10. In the biblical account, two women claimed to be the mother of a
boy. When King Solomon proposed to divide the child with a sword and give each woman half,
one woman agreed, while the other woman, whose "heart yearned for her son," exclaimed, "Oh,
my Lord, give her the living child, and by no means slay it." King Solomon, with "the wisdom of
God... to render justice," then knew that this was the child's real mother, and gave the child to
her. 1 Kings 3:23-28. Custody disputes in today's society, however, often make Solomon's deci-
sion appear simple.
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children they have raised? Or should the focus be primarily on the welfare
of the child?
The highly publicized Baby Jessica case has drawn attention to other
child custody cases involving disputes between biological parents and third
parties, especially in the adoption context.4 Although media attention has
created the impression that these cases are becoming rampant, experts urge
that such situations do not arise frequently.' For the families involved,
however, even one such case is too many. Media accounts have struck fear
into the hearts of adoptive parents, who are now afraid of losing their chil-
dren to biological parents.' The widespread attention has also moved chil-
dren's rights into the legal forefront and sparked a movement for adoption
reform.7 More specifically, these cases have shed light on the problems
inherent in adoption and custody laws. Because each state has its own
legislation relating to adoption,' termination of parental rights,9 and custody
disputes between biological parents and third parties,10 variations among
4. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
5. See Carol McHugh, Experts: Adoption Contests Not Common-But Risks Are, Cni.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3 ("The recent spate of challenges nationwide to adoption
proceedings represents a tiny ripple in the pool of successful adoptions .... ); cf Shannon Buggs,
Who Really Wins?; Judge Lets Teen Sever Ties with her Birth Family; Rights Debate Intensifies,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al ("'It happens more often than you think, but it's
still a rare occurrence,' said Mark McDermott, past president of the American Academy of Adop-
tion Attorneys in Washington D.C.").
6. See, e.g., Michael Rezendes, Nature v. Nurture: The Parents' Debate; Publicized Rul-
ings Stir Questions on Custody, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1993, National/Foreign, at 3.
7. This movement is strengthening a continued effort to reform adoption laws. See Susan L.
Brooks, Note, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Permanency Planning
for Children with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1130, 1141-50 (1991); Mark Eckstein, Note,
Adoption Reform: A Proposal, 10 NEw ENG. L. REv. 371 (1971); Constance J. Miller, Comment,
Best Interests of Children and the Interests of Adoptive Parents: Isn't it Time for Comprehensive
Reform?, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 749, 758-807 (1985).
8. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 21.4, at 600 (2d ed. 1988); Brooks, supra note 7, at 1134-35. Brooks observes:
American adoption law originated in the nineteenth century and was designed to meet
the needs of parents looking to adopt healthy infants. State adoption laws dictated that
adoptions be in the best interests of the child. However, this vague standard allowed
individual judges broad discretion and resulted in a poorly developed adoption-law ju-
risprudence. . . . [The vagueness of state adoption laws prevents state courts from
rectifying the inadequacies in the states' systems.... The nineteenth-century attempt to
codify adoption law failed to produce uniform standards or procedures governing
adoption.
Id. at 1136. This Comment suggests that the twentieth-century response to these inadequacies
should be to produce uniform standards and procedures that take into account the interests of all
involved parties while focusing on the needs of the child. See infra notes 334-91 and accompany-
ing text.
9. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, § 21.4.
10. See infra notes 303-29 and accompanying text.
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the states often contribute to the failure of the legal system to prevent situa-
tions like Baby Jessica's from occurring.
This Comment examines the rights of the parties involved in these
disputes, 1 analyzes the inconsistencies in the law that lead to such uneasy
resolutions,' 2 and considers the possible solutions, or prevention, of the
tragedies that occur when judges are faced with "Solomon's children."' 3
Following an examination of three recent, highly publicized custody deci-
sions in the adoption context, Part II of the Comment traces the history of
the constitutional protections afforded to children, parents, and the parent-
child relationship.' 4 Part Hm then examines both the social and legal defini-
tion of family and the boundaries of the constitutionally protected family. 5
Against this constitutional backdrop, Part IV explores the uncertain legal
rights of those having a stake in the adoption process-adoptive parents,' 6
unwed fathers,' 7 and children. 8 Part V then reviews the standards that
states use in custody proceedings between biological parents and third par-
ties. 9 In Part VI, the Comment explores methods of reforming the system
through uniform adoption laws20 and the modification of standards used in
custody rulings.2' Finally, Part VII concludes that the legal system should
strive to uphold traditional principles in light of current realities and recog-
nize that children's family relationships, regardless of biology, deserve
protection.22
I. HIGHLIGHTING THE UNCERTAINTY IN PRIVATE ADOPTION: THREE
RECENT CASES
A. Baby Jessica
The facts of the Baby Jessica case have become all too familiar.2 3 On
February 8, 1991, Cara Clausen gave birth to Jessica in Iowa. Two days
11. See infra notes 229-302 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 303-29 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 334-95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 97-228 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 229-66 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 267-88 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 289-302 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 303-29 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 330-73 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 374-91 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 392-95 and accompanying text.
23. The media has repeatedly told the story of the child whose mother lied about the identity
of the child's biological father, who then fought the adoptive parents for custody of the child. See,
e.g., Baby Jessica; Her Wrenching Custody Battle Tore the Hearts of Parents and Stepparents
Alike as It Raised the Issue of Children's Rights-or Lack of Them, PEOPLE, Jan. 3, 1994, at 69,
69; Geoffrey Cowley et al., Who's Looking After the Interests of Children?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16,
1993, at 54, 54; Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?: The Courts Viewed Jessica DeBoer More
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later, Clausen signed a release-of-custody form relinquishing her parental
rights.24 She named Scott Seefeldt as the father, and he also signed the
forms relinquishing his rights.25 On February 25, Jan and Robbie DeBoer,
Michigan residents, filed a petition in Iowa's juvenile court to adopt Jes-
sica.26 At the hearing, the court terminated the parental rights of Clausen
and Seefeldt and granted the DeBoers custody of Jessica.27 Less than one
month after the hearing, Clausen changed her mind, attempted to revoke her
release of custody, and filed an affidavit in juvenile court stating that she
had knowingly named the wrong man as the father of her child.2" Dan
Schmidt, Jessica's biological father, sought to intervene in the adoption pro-
ceeding, claiming that his parental rights had not been terminated because
he had never consented to the adoption.29 Lacking subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the juvenile court dismissed both Clausen's request to revoke her re-
lease of custody and Schmidt's attempt to claim custody.3 °
In December 1991, the district court found that Schmidt was the bio-
logical father, that the DeBoers had failed to prove that he had abandoned
Jessica,3 and that an analysis of the child's best interests was unwar-
ranted.32 The district court ordered that Jessica be returned to her biological
father,33 but the Iowa Supreme Court stayed the transfer, pending the
DeBoers' appeal.34 The DeBoers refused to give Jessica to Schmidt and
as Properly Than as a Person; Now She Must Return to Her Biological Parents, Time, July 19,
1993, at 44, 44. The public may not be as aware of the complicated legal proceedings that took
over two and a half years.
24. DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 501 N.W.2d 193, 193 (Mich. 1993). At this time
Jessica was referred to as Baby Girl Clausen (B.G.C.). Id.
25. Id. at 194.
26. Id.
27. Id. Cam Clausen was given notice, but did not attend the hearing. Id. Having been
granted custody, the DeBoers took Jessica back to Michigan with them. Id.
28. Id. Dan Schmidt, the biological father, filed an affidavit of paternity on March 12, 1991.
Id.
29. Id.
30. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the adoption petition had already
been filed. Id.
31. Id. Abandonment is one of the grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights
in Iowa, as in many other states. See IOWA CODE § 232.116 (1992); UNip. ADOvrnON Acr §§ 6,
19, 9 U.L.A. 26, 51 (1979).
32. DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. 1993). Rejecting the
DeBoers' argument that a best interests analysis governed a termination issue in an adoption
proceeding, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the analysis is not appro-
priate until one of the grounds for termination of parental rights is found. In re B.G.C., 496
N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992).
33. DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
34. Id. at 195. On September 23, 1992, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed both the court of
appeals's decision to terminate Cara Clausen's parental rights and the district court's decision. Id.
at 195. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that Cam had not been denied her constitutional rights
even though she had consented to the adoption only 40 hours after the baby was born, as opposed
to the statutorily proscribed 72 hour waiting period in Iowa. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 243-44.
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instead sought to modify the custody decree by filing a petition in a Michi-
gan circuit court.3" After a best interests hearing, the Michigan court ruled
that Jessica should remain with the DeBoers. 6 Schmidt appealed to the
Michigan Court of Appeals, which found that the circuit court lacked juris-
diction and that the DeBoers lacked standing to challenge the custody de-
cree.37 The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision and ordered
that Jessica be returned to the Schmidts.38 By the time the case reached the
Michigan Supreme Court, Jessica had been living with the DeBoers for two
and a half years.39
In July 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied the DeBoers'
petition to stay the Michigan Supreme Court's order to transfer Jessica to
the Schmidts.40 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun echoed the reaction of so
many who watched Jessica on her last day with the DeBoers: "This is a
case," he began, "that touches the raw nerves of life's relationships.'
Blackmun found that because of "the personal vulnerability of the child so
much at risk ... [and the] fundamental disagreement over the duty and
authority of state courts to consider the best interests of a child when ren-
dering a custody decree,"'42 the Court should have granted the stay pending
careful consideration of the petition for certiorari.43 By denying the stay,
the Court allowed the Schmidts to take Baby Jessica from the DeBoers.
35. DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d at 195. The DeBoers filed the petition pursuant to the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), codified in Michigan as MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.651-
.673 (1992). Under the UCCJA, which has been adopted in all 50 states, a court has jurisdiction
to modify an existing custody decree if it is the home state or a state in which the child has a
significant connection and jurisdiction would be in the child's best interests. See, e.g., id. The
DeBoers alleged that Michigan met the home state requirements and that it would be in Jessica's
best interests for Michigan to have jurisdiction. DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d at 195. After the best
interests hearing, the circuit court entered an ex parte order enjoining Schmidt from removing the
child from Washtenaw County, Michigan. Id.
36. Id. at 196.
37. Id. The court held that the DeBoers, as former adoptive parents, lacked standing to initi-
ate a custody action after the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the denial of the adoption petition and
the district court terminated their rights as temporary guardians and custodians, even though the
child had lived with them most of her life. Id. at 197. The court also noted that rights to legal
custody cannot be based on the fact that a child resides or has resided with the third party; the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act does not give standing to third parties who do not possess
substantive rights to the child's custody. Id. The denial of standing to prospective adoptive par-
ents is one of the main problems in cases like this. Without standing, a child's "parents" will not
be able to bring a custody action. For a discussion of whether prospective adoptive parents'
family relationships deserve constitutional protection, see infra notes 229-66 and accompanying
text.
38. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich. 1993). Daniel Schmidt married
Cara Clausen in April 1992. Id. at 652 n.6.
39. See id. at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting).
40. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
41. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent.
42. Id. at 11-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Baby Richard
While Baby Jessica was beginning a new life with her biological par-
ents, a judge on the Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that two-and-a-half-
year-old Baby Richard should remain in the custody of his adoptive par-
ents.' The facts were similar to those in the Baby Jessica case: The
child's unwed mother, Daniella Janikova, consented to placing her son for
adoption four days after he was born.45 The child's father, Otakar Kirch-
ner,46 was told the child had died shortly after birth.4' He discovered, fifty-
seven days after the baby was born, that the infant had been placed for
adoption and contested the adoption on the grounds that he had never con-
sented.48 The trial court found that Mr. Kirchner was an unfit parent,
whose consent to the adoption was therefore unnecessary, and terminated
his parental rights.49 The court then entered a judgment for adoption by the
Does, with whom Richard had been living since he was four days old.50
The Illinois Appellate Court, stressing that the best interests of the child are
the paramount issue,5 affirmed the lower court's termination of Mr. Kirch-
ner's rights and judgment of adoption.52 The court found "clear and con-
vincing evidence that there was no reasonable degree of interest indicated
by... [the father] in the first thirty days of the life of this child."5 3 There-
fore, Mr. Kirchner was declared unfit, and his consent to the adoption was
44. In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 I1. App. LEXIS 1271, at *2 (Aug. 18, 1993), appeal
granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (111. 1993).
45. Id. at *1-*5.
46. Id. at *1.
47. Id. at *6. Ms. Janikova refused to tell the father about the child because she suspected
that he was cheating on her in Czechoslovakia, where he was visiting his ill grandmother. Id. at
*3. Ms. Janikova moved out of her apartment and into a shelter for abused women and decided to
give up the child for adoption. ld. She would not, however, disclose the father's name to the
proposed adoptive parents or their lawyer. Id. at *4. Meanwhile, she avoided Mr. Kirchner on all
but two occasions. Id. at *4-*5. The two later reconciled and married on Sept. 12, 1991. Id. at
*8.
48. Id. at *1.
49. 1a at *8.
50. Id. at *2, *5-*6.
51. Id. at *11. The court elaborated that "[in an adoption, custody or abuse case .... the
child is the real party in interest. Since the child is the real party in interest, it is his best interest
and corollary rights that come before anything else, including the interests and rights of biological
and adoptive parents." Id.
52. Ld. at *2.
53. Id. at *9-*10. Under the Illinois statute, the unwed father must demonstrate "a reason-
able degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during the
first 30 days after its birth." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 50/(I)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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not required. 4  Applying a "best interests" test,55 the court found that
Richard should remain with his adoptive parents.56
C. Baby Pete
Both the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases have already affected
child custody disputes between biological parents and third parties, as evi-
denced by the "unique" outcome of the Vermont case involving Baby
Pete.57 In this case, as in the other two, the child's biological mother con-
sented to the adoption of her child, who was placed with a couple one week
after his birth.58 The mother named her boyfriend as the father, but the true
biological father was her estranged husband, who claimed custody several
months after the baby was born.59 Rather than embarking on a treacherous
custody battle, the adoptive parents and biological father reached a settle-
ment whereby the child's adoptive parents would maintain physical cus-
tody, while the father, whose name would appear on the birth certificate,
would have visitation rights.60 The parties thus decided the best interests of
the child without judicial intervention. 6' As the biological father said, "No-
body lost, and the baby won."6'
54. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 50/8(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
55. For a discussion of the "best interests of the child" test and the other standards states use
in custody proceedings, see infra notes 311-29 and accompanying text.
56. In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1271, at *18-*19 (Aug. 18, 1993),
appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (111. 1993). In so ruling, the court stated: "Plainly, it would be
contrary to the best interest of Richard to 'switch' parents at this stage in his life.... Courts are
here to protect children, not victimize them." Id. The battle for Baby Richard is not over, how-
ever, as the Illinois Supreme Court has agreed to hear Kirchner's appeal. In re Doe, 624 N.E.2d
807 (11. 1993); Darlene Gavron Stevens, Adoption Reformers Target Baby Richard Case, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 6, 1994, Chicagoland, at 1.
57. Judith Gaines, 'Unique' Adoption Ruling; Both Sides Cheer Settlement that Shares Vt.
Boy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1993, Metro/Region, at 1.
58. Id. at 1, 28.
59. Id. The case was complicated by the mother's contention that she had no interest in
reconciling with her husband, who at the time was also fighting for custody of their two other
children. Id. at 28.
60. Id. at 1.
61. For an example of a situation in which a prospective adoptive couple opted to relinquish
the child to her biological father rather than subjecting her to a drawn-out interstate custody battle,
see Bruce Vielmetti, Couple to Give Kara to Her Biological Dad, ST. PErERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
16, 1993, at IB, 5B.
62. Gaines, supra note 57, at 1. Although the Baby Richard case also has been praised for
taking the child's best interests into consideration, the biological father has lost the opportunity to
establish a relationship with his child.
Although each of the cases described above deals with young children caught in the wake of
custody disputes between biological fathers and couples who thought they had legally adopted
their children, two cases involving older children also made headlines and invoked comparison
with these cases. See, e.g., Cowley et al., supra note 23, at 54; Dispute Grows Over Rights of
Children; Some See New Emphasis on Them as 'Highly Destructive' to Families, ST. Louis PosT-
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I-. THE, RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The recognition of children's rights is largely a twentieth-century de-
velopment.63 Early Roman law and English common law viewed the child
as property under the exclusive control of the father.' 4 In Rome, the fa-
ther's rights were limitless; he had the power of life or death over his chil-
dren.65 While English common law was less extreme, the father had a right
to the "custody, labor, and services of his child which was superior to the
mother's rights and in some instances was enforceable regardless of the
child's welfare."66 It was not until the early nineteenth century that the
father began to be regarded as the child's guardian, instead of owner, and
the mother was considered the child's primary nurturing source.
67
DISPATCH, Aug. 20, 1993, at 5B; Larry Rohter, Florida Girl, 14, Wins Right Not to See Biological
Family, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al-16.
In Florida, a judge ruled that 14-year-old Kimberly Mays had standing to terminate the rights
of her biological parents and remain with the only father she has ever known. Dick Lehr, Fla.
Judge Rules for Girl, 14; Lift Seen for Children's Rights, BosToN GLOBE, Aug. 19, 1993, at 1.
This case was an unfortunate switched-at-birth case. Kimberly's biological parents, whose daugh-
ter died in childhood, discovered Kimberly was their biological child when she was already 9;
they subsequently sought visitation with her. See Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. App.
1989). Kimberly Mays fought to deny them visitation. Id. On August 18, 1993, Circuit Judge
Stephen Dakan held that the man who had raised her, Robert Mays, was her legal father; however,
he did not go so far as to say Kimberly had "divorced" her natural parents, even though ties with
them were severed. See Lehr, supra, at 1, 15. "Family law specialists hailed the decision for
promoting the rights of children, although the ruling's legal impact is limited." Id. at 1. Ironi-
cally, Kimberly Mays later had "personal difficulties" with her father and moved into the home of
her biological parents. Ginia Bellafante, Back Track, TIME, Mar. 21, 1994, at 79, 79.
The attorney who represented Kimberly Mays was the same man who was trying to adopt
Gregory K., his foster son who brought an action in his own behalf to "divorce" his natural mother
and remain in the custody of his foster parents, who wished to adopt him. See Kingsley v. Kings-
ley, 623 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. App. 1993), review denied, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 164 (Jan. 21, 1994).
The Florida Court of Appeals upheld his "divorce" from his biological mother, but only because
adults had made the request, not because the trial judge had granted him legal standing to sue. Id.
at 790. The appellate court, however, dismissed the boy's adoption by his foster family. Id. at
789. This case, as well as the Mays case, has helped increase awareness of children's rights and
has added to the debate over whether parenthood is a function of nature or nurture.
63. For a discussion of the views of ancient historians, philosophers, and jurists on the status
of children and their rights, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHwARTZ, CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS AND THE LAW 7-21 (1987).
64. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53.
65. Id.
66. Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental
Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 975 (1988); see also Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell,
Coming ofAge: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes,
27 EMORY L.J. 209, 209-10 (1978) ("By the seventeenth century parental autonomy was only
slightly more limited. Murder was proscribed, but the parent-child relationship was otherwise free
from societal intervention.").
67. COMMrTEE ON THE FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
NEw TRENDS IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 22-23 (1980) [hereinafter NEw TRENDS]. In
Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817), poet Percy Bysshe Shelley lost custody of
his children because the court found his atheistic beliefs immoral. After this case, a preference
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American law reflected this English common-law heritage until the
turn of the century, when "a revolution in children's rights began."68 State
courts started to recognize limited rights for children, particularly in abusive
situations. In the Mary Ellen case, 6 9 the New York Supreme Court pro-
tected a child's right not to be abused and "provid[ed] an impetus for en-
actment of the 'cruelty to children' criminal statutes."7° Shortly before this
decision, a court had first referred to a state's parens patriae7' right to pro-
tect children in Ex parte Crouse.72 In this case, the court acknowledged
that the state has an interest in "the virtue and knowledge of its members"
that allows the state to act as the parent to protect the child's welfare.
7 3
In the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court began to recognize that
children have constitutional rights.74 Ironically, this protection of chil-
dren's rights grew out of cases recognizing the rights of parents in the par-
ent-child relationship. In Meyer v. Nebraska75 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,76 which both addressed the education of children, the Court
strongly supported the interests of parents in making decisions concerning
emerged for awarding custody to the mother if she was fit. NEw TRENDS, supra, at 22. This
preference became known as the "tender years" doctrine, a rebuttable presumption that the mother
should be granted custody of a young child. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 477, 496. See generally
Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAm. L. 423 (1976-77)
(describing the history and application of the presumption).
68. McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 210.
69. Mary Ellen Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8, col. 2, reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND
YoUTH IN AMERICA 185-87 (R. Bremner ed., 1974).
70. See McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 210, 210-11 nn.7-8.
71. Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term "refers traditionally to the role of state as sovereign and guardian
of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane;.., and, in child custody determi-
nations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child." Id.
72. 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). See McCarthy, supra note 66, at 975-76; McGough & Shindell,
supra note 66, at 209 n.2. In 1899, Illinois established the first juvenile court; every other state
soon followed. Id. at 211 & nn.9-10. For a review of the parens patriae doctrine and its origins,
see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195
(1978).
73. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
74. The Constitution makes no reference to children, family, or the parent-child relationship.
See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 ILL. L. Rav. 1, 1 (1992). Further-
more, family law has traditionally fallen within state court jurisdiction. Although federal courts
have been reluctant to intervene in the area of domestic relations, they have become more in-
volved as a result of the "promulgation by the federal government of comprehensive social wel-
fare programs affecting the family... [and] the elaboration of constitutional law in the areas of
due process, equal protection and the right to privacy." EVA R. RUaN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 12-13 (1986); see also Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-
Power System: The United States' Experience, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1081, 1092 (1986) (noting that
as late as 1956 the Supreme Court emphasized the states' domain over domestic relations and
stating that, although varied, state legislation has reflected, "on the whole, traditional family
values").
75. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
76. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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their children's futures.77 In Meyer, the Court pronounced that "the
right[s] of the individual... to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren" 78 were due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
79
Holding that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign lan-
guages in public or private schools was unconstitutional, the Court affirmed
the right of parents to direct their children's education 0
The Court again recognized constitutional protection of the parent-
child relationship in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"1 in which it held unconsti-
tutional an Oregon statute mandating public school attendance.8" Relying
on Meyer, the Court ruled in favor of the parents' right to choose another
type of school for their children.8 3 The Court also indicated that parental
authority extended beyond educational matters to upbringing. 4 In support
of protecting parents' rights, the Court stated that "[t]he child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."8"
The Court later acknowledged, however, that parental rights are not
without limits. In Prince v. Massachusetts,6 the Court recognized the in-
terests of the state in protecting children, even when those interests conflict
77. The Court later stated explicitly in Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944),
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first with the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither
supply nor hinder."
78. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The Court held that a teacher's right to teach a foreign language
in a public school, as well as the "opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and ... the power
of parents to control the education of their own," outweighed the state's interest in "Americaniz-
ing" its citizens. Id. at 401.
79. See DAVIS & ScHwARTz, supra note 63, at 52-53 (stating that the decision was "the only
pronouncement on the meaning of due process of law in the family context" until Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding a statutory prohibition of a married couple's use
of contraceptives unconstitutional), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding a
statutory ban on interracial marriage unconstitutional)).
80. The German teacher, not the parent, challenged the statute because it denied him the right
to teach the foreign language. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. However, the Court based its decision not
only on his liberty interest, but also on the interest of the parents. Id. at 401-02.
81. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
82. Id. at 534-35.
83. Id. The parents were not the ones who challenged the statute, however; the private
schools challenged its constitutionality because it affected their economic success.
84. Id.
85. Id. Commentators have discussed both Meyer and Pierce as parents' rights cases, family
rights cases, and precursors to children's rights cases. See, e.g., DAvIs & SCHWARTZ, supra note
63, at 52-54; Rum, supra note 74, at 120-123; Suzette M. Haynie, Comment, Biological Parents
v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv.
705, 727 & nn.76-78 (1986); see also Clark, supra note 74, at 3 (noting that "the fact that lawyers
do not think of [cases like) these... as essentially 'childrens' cases' does not mean that they do
not have significant consequences for children").
86. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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with the parents' wishes.87 The Court held that when the state's interest in
the well-being of the child is compelling, the state, as parens patriae, may
properly restrict the parent's control over the child.88 Predicting which situ-
ations the Court considers compelling, however, is difficult.8 9
Although cases like Meyer, Pierce, and Prince touched on children's
rights collaterally, the Court focused in those cases on the rights of parents
to make decisions for their children.9" The first pure children's rights case
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.91 In
Tinker, the Court specifically addressed children's First Amendment rights
when it held that the state's interest in controlling conduct in the schools
does not outweigh a child's right to express himself in school by wearing a
black armband in protest of the Vietnam War.92 Recognizing that children
are "'persons' under our Constitution,"93 the Court found that "[tihey are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State." 94 Although the
Court has been unpredictable in its recognition of children's rights since
87. Id. at 166-71. The Court upheld a statute forbidding a child to sell or offer to sell materi-
als on a street or in a public place and punished any parent or guardian allowing or promoting
such behavior. Id. The Court found that the state's interest in protecting children from danger on
the public streets was sufficient to justify restricting the child's or guardian's exercise of religion.
Id. at 169-70.
88. Id. at 166.
89. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court found the state failed to meet the
Prince test and barred the state from interfering with parents' rights to take their children out of
school for religious purposes. Id. at 213-19. The Court focused on the long history and tradition
of the Amish in educating their children within the Amish community, id. at 216-19, and held that
the Amish could choose not to send their children to public school past the eighth grade. Id. at
228-29. The decision in Yoder may be considered a vindication of the rights of parents, as op-
posed to the rights of children, because the children had no voice in the decision not to attend
school past the eighth grade. See DAvIs & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 58. Interestingly, Justice
Douglas, in dissent, argued that children have a right to be heard in matters relating to their future.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the Yoder decision, see RUBIN,
supra note 74, at 119-34.
90. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
91. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
92. Id. at 504, 509; cf Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding a
school district's action disciplining a student who used an extended sexual metaphor in his nomi-
nation speech for a candidate running for class office). The decision in Bethel supports the argu-
ment that Tinker's holding is limited to the protection of political speech.
93. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. The Court in Tinker established the principle that children have
First Amendment rights that are not "shed... at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
94. Id. at 511. This case may also be viewed as a parents' rights or family rights case be-
cause the children may actually have been mirroring the views of their parents by wearing the
armbands. Had the children expressed views opposite to those of their parents and against their
parents' wishes, the Court may not have been so liberal. See DAvIs & SCHWAR'Z, supra note 63,
at 59.
1290 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
Tinker,95 the cases make clear that children are no longer under the exclu-
sive control of their parents.96 At the same time, the Court has confirmed
that the state may not interfere with the parent-child relationship absent a
compelling interest in the child's welfare.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECrION OF THE FAMILY: A BASIS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. Constitutional Recognition of Family Integrity
Although the Constitution does not explicitly afford protection to the
"family," the Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to the
family under the Fourteenth Amendment.97 The Court's holdings concern-
ing families' rights have addressed both the definition of family9" and the
95. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (upholding the principle
that states may enact statutes requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982) (upholding a statute prohibiting the distribution
of materials depicting sexual performances to children under 16); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
620 (1979) (upholding Georgia's statutory scheme allowing parents voluntarily to commit their
child to a mental institution); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 (1977) (upholding the use
of corporal punishment in the schools); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 582 (1975) (holding
that children have procedural due process rights and declaring unconstitutional an Ohio statute
allowing for suspension of students without notice or hearing).
Although the law protects children in some areas (such as employment, the making of con-
tracts, and medical decision-making in life-threatening situations), it grants children autonomy in
others (such as the ability to decide about emancipation and, at least in some instances, abortion).
DAvis & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 201. "These disparate results stem from an inherent con-
flict in the law-a kind of schizophrenia-between the desire to accord children a greater degree
of control over their lives and freedom of choice, and the need, on the other hand, to protect them
from others, their surroundings, and, sometimes, from their own folly." Id.
96. Children's rights may be viewed in different ways. One commentator divides children's
rights into three categories: "(1) constitutional rights of children asserted directly against the
state; (2) rights that are dependent upon levels of skill or maturity; and (3) rights granted to
children by the state because they serve the interests of children as children." McCarthy, supra
note 66, at 1013.
Professor Michael Wald, another commentator, describes four different categories of chil-
dren's rights:
(A) generalized claims against the world ... (B) the right to greater protection from
abuse, neglect, or exploitation by adults; (C) the right to be treated in the same manner
as an adult, with the same constitutional protections, in relationship to state actions; (D)
the right to act independently of parental control and/or guidance.
Id. at n.145; see also DAvis & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 72-73 (describing Professor Wald's
categorization of children's rights).
97. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Equal
Protection Clause has also been implicated as affording protection for the family. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that the rights to marry and procreate are
fundamental).
98. See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text. However, this right is limited. See infra
notes 130-47 and accompanying text.
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family's right to make certain decisions. 9 The Supreme Court has held that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest"'I  and has extended protection to the family in areas
such as marriage, 101 procreation, 10 2 contraception, 10 3 abortion," and child-
rearing.' In granting such protection, the Court has respected the "sanc-
tity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and tradition."'0 6 The Court has emphasized
the family's traditional function of furthering social and moral values and
has especially focused on the parents' instrumental role in instilling these
values in their children. 0 7 The Court's recognition of the family's "sanc-
tity" thus derives from and contributes to the emphasis placed on the impor-
tance of the parent-child relationship.
B. The Definition of Family and the Boundaries of Constitutional
Protection
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects
various aspects of the family, as well as the parent-child relationship, deter-
mining what constitutes a "family" and who may be considered "parents"
for purposes of such protection has proved difficult. The concept of the
family has traditionally been that of the nuclear family-a husband, wife,
and their biological children. 08 While historically the nuclear family may
have been the norm, the makeup of the family has changed over the past
99. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
100. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citations omitted).
101. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
102. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
103. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
485.
104. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
105. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also RUBIN, supra
note 74, at 27 (calling these rights "almost 'natural' rights"). Moreover, the Court has deemed the
rights of procreation and child-rearing "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
"basic civil rights of man," Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, and "[rnights far more precious ... than
property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
106. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Likewise, Justice Powell
noted that the constitutional protection of the parent-child relationship is founded on tradition. See
id. at n.12.
107. Id. at 503-04.
108. For a discussion of the nuclear family and its function, see ARLENE S. SKOLNICK &
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, FAMIL IN TRANsTON 7-8 (1971); cf. MARvIN HARRIS, CULTURAL AN-
THROPOLOGY 131-32 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that although the nuclear family is universal (or nearly
universal) and has been found in at least 250 societies, "it has long been obvious that every other
culture has alternative forms of domestic organization and that these frequently are more impor-
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century. 10 9 The past few decades have marked a shift from the traditional
nuclear family to an increasing number of nontraditional families-those
with single parents,"o step-parents,"' foster children," 2 other relatives,"13
homosexual parents," 4 and children born from new reproductive technolo-
gies or surrogates."' Today, the nuclear family is more an ideal than a
reality."1
6
tant, involving a higher proportion of the population, than the nuclear family"). For examples of
such alternative forms of organization, see id. at 133-34.
109. See RuN, supra note 74, at 21. "There has been a rapid change in family life and in
standards of personal behavior[, ... but as yet no consensus has been reached as to what is
happening, where we are going or what we are ready to accept as the norm." Id. at 12.
110. See, e.g., WILIAM FEIGELMAN & ARNOLD R. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: Nn~w
PATrERNs OF ADOPIVE RELATIONSHIPS 18 (1983) ("[A]s many as four children out of ten born in
the 1970s will spend at least part of their childhood in a single-parent family."); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 306-15 (1988) (discussing "nonmarital
motherhood-by-choice" and noting that "[tlwenty-two percent of children grow up in single-
parent families, most of which are headed by women").
111. See, e.g., Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Ap-
proach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1640 & n.3 (1991) (noting that
between 1980 and 1985 the number of children living with a stepparent increased from 6,082,000
to 6,789,000).
112. See, e.g., Vincent S. Nadile, Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships:
Needed Statutory Protections for Foster Parents, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv 221, 221-22 & n.13
(1987) (noting that the number of children in foster care may be as high as 750,000).
113. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. Ray. 879,
882-83 (1984) (urging states not to presume exclusivity of natural parenthood).
114. See, e.g., Kimberly P. Carr, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of
the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1021, 1022 (1991) (considering custody
and visitation rights to a child born to a lesbian couple via artificial insemination); Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Chil-
dren in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990)
(estimating statistics on lesbian motherhood).
115. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. REv. 637, 673-89 (1993) (discussing surrogate mother cases); John L. Hill, What Does
It Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 353, 353-54 & n.3 (1991) (discussing artificial insemination).
116. See CON'RAD P. KOTrACK, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 208 (5th ed. 1991).
Nonnuclear family arrangements now outnumber the 'traditional' American household
by more than three to one.... The traditional nuclear family with the husband working
to support his dependent wife and children has become the exception rather than the rule
and is now typical of fewer than 10 percent of all households.
Id. at 209.
Kottack lists as reasons for the declining nuclear family a change in marriage patterns-
specifically, a decrease in the number of marriages and an increase in the divorce rate-the in-
crease in the number of working women, and the increase in out-of-wedlock births and one-parent
families. Id. at 208-09; see also FAMILY SERVICE AMERICA, THE STATE OF FAMILIES 1984-1985
7-15, 23, 32, 60, 72-77 (naming the same reasons for the decline in the number of nuclear fami-
lies, and including the impact of social, technological, and population changes); cf. FEIGELMAN &
SILVERMAN, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that the changes in the family-such as the increase in
divorce rate, growing acceptance of single-parent and other nontraditional lifestyles, and the de-
crease in fertility and number of family members-have had an impact on adoption practices).
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Although many commentators have urged the public to accept the le-
gitimacy of such families, 1 7 legal recognition has been slow to follow.
History, tradition, the reluctance of courts to recognize liberty interests, and
the often emotional nature of family law contribute to the law's difficulty in
adapting to the changing family." 8 Thus, those whom the public may con-
sider as part of a family do not necessarily gain family status in the law. 119
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty in defining fam-
ily-and parent-for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 20 Although
the traditional definition and "usual understanding of 'family' imply biolog-
ical relationships,"'12  the Court is aware that such relationships "are not
exclusive determination[s] of the existence of a family."'12  This recogni-
tion that biological ties are not conclusive has led the Court to consider not
only that constitutional protection may not include certain classes of natural
117. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 113, at 882-83; Nadile, supra note 112, at 221; Note, supra
note 111, at 1643-44 & nn.22-23.
118. See RutiN, supra note 74, at 12. Rubin describes the effect these factors have on mem-
bers of the Supreme Court who,
aware that personal beliefs and prejudices influence decision-making, try to avoid read-
ing their personal predilections into the law[. B]ut attitudes and emotions about this
family realm are rooted in such unconscious layers of the mind that it has been particu-
larly difficult for them to recognize their own hidden biases.
Id.
119. See Note, supra note 111, at 1643.
In recent years the legal definition of family has resulted in the denial of benefits to a
growing number of individuals involved in many types of nontraditional relationships
that do not possess the ties of blood, adoption, or marriage associated with the tradi-
tional nuclear family.... The current legal definition of family may also deny benefits
to stepfamilies, foster families, grandparents, and parents of children born through re-
productive technologies.
Id. That note, which focuses primarily on legitimizing homosexual family status, distinguishes
between "formal" and "functional" judicial responses to challenges to the definition of "family."
Id. at 1644-59. A court using the "formal" approach "defines family relationships according to the
model of the traditional nuclear family unless it finds an historical or statutory basis for expanding
the definition to nontraditional forms." Id. at 1645. Under the "functional" approach, a court
focuses on whether the relationship exhibits the same essential characteristics and fulfills the same
needs as the traditional family relationship. Id. Specific characteristics include "economic coop-
eration, participation in domestic responsibilities, and affection between the parties." Id. at 1646.
Advocates who seek recognition for the rights of nontraditional families prefer the functionalist
approach. Id. at 1651 n.64 (citing works by legal scholars such as Joseph Goldstein and Katherine
Bartlett).
120. Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-43 (1977) ("Although
considerable difficulty has attended the task of defining 'family' for purposes of the Due Process
Clause, we are not without guides to some of the elements that define the concept of 'family' and
contribute to its place in our society." (citation omitted)); ROBiN, supra note 74, at 14 ("The Court
has never been reluctant to extend constitutional protections to the family; the problems have
come in deciding what kind of creature this constitutionally protected family is.").
121. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843.
122. Id. The Court emphasizes that the marriage relationship, "the basic foundation of the
family in our society," is not a blood relationship, but one that nonetheless has gained significant
constitutional protection. Id.
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parents, but also that such protection may extend to non-nuclear family
relationships.
The Supreme Court first recognized that the non-nuclear family struc-
ture deserves protection when a plurality conferred rights on the extended
family in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.123 In this case, a grandmother
challenged the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that restricted occu-
pancy to single families. 124 The definition of family in the ordinance125
excluded Moore's family, which consisted of her son and two grandsons,
who were cousins.1 26 Applying a substantive due process analysis, a four
justice plurality stated that the right of a family-even a non-nuclear fam-
ily-to live together is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 The plurality concluded that
while the state's interests in preventing overcrowding and traffic congestion
and reducing the burden on the local public schools were legitimate, the
ordinance bore "a tenuous relationship" to those ends.1 28 Emphasizing re-
spect for family sanctity and the tradition of extended family members liv-
ing in the same household, the Court struck down the ordinance and thereby
extended familial constitutional protection beyond the scope of the nuclear
family.129
123. 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (plurality opinion). Changes in the traditional family struc-
ture were mentioned for the first time in this "key 'family' case of the decade." RuMn, supra note
74, at 144.
124. Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-96 (plurality opinion).
125. The Housing Code of the city of East Cleveland, Ohio, limited the definition of family to:
(1) the spouse of the nominal head of the household; (2) unmarried children of either the nominal
head of the household or spouse, as long as the unmarried children had no dependent children
residing with them; (3) parents of either the nominal head of the household or his or her spouse;
and (4) "not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the
household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent
children of such dependent child." Id. at 496 n.2 (citing OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1341.08 (An-
derson 1966)).
126. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 499 (plurality opinion). The plurality emphasized that "[o]urs is by no means a
tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition
of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." Id. at
504 (plurality opinion). The plurality added that such arrangements were not uncommon. Id. at
505 (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 500 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 503-04 (plurality opinion). Had history not revealed the prevalence and acceptance
of the extended family, the plurality might have been more reluctant to extend them constitutional
protection. See id. at 507-11 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court's decision that
East Cleveland's narrow definition of "family" represented only the type of family most prevalent
in "White Suburbia" and excluded the tradition of extended families in the country). Justice Bren-
nan stated, "The 'extended family' that provided generations of early Americans with social serv-
ices and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the beachhead for
successive waves of immigrants ... remains ... a pervasive living pattern [in our country] ......
Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also supported protecting the extended fam-
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Despite its willingness to recognize constitutional protection of non-
nuclear families in some contexts, the Court has been more reluctant to
extend this protection beyond the nuclear family in child custody cases. In
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,30 foster parents, in conjunction
with several foster parent organizations, challenged the constitutionality of
New York's regulatory scheme for removing foster children from their
homes. 13 1 The parents argued that they had a liberty interest in the preser-
vation of their "psychological family"-which had formed after one year of
living with their foster childrent 3 2-and were therefore entitled to more
procedural protection than the statute required. 133 The Court indicated a
willingness to expand its definition of family, recognizing that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals in-
volved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the instruc-
tion of children... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.
No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interde-
pendent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her
care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship.13 1
The Smith Court, however, declined to decide whether the "loving" rela-
tionships between foster parents and foster children are liberty interests
worthy of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 35
ily by discussing that the family in an earlier decision actually consisted of an aunt and her niece.
Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
For an anthropological discussion of the extended family, see HARRIS, supra note 108, at
137:
In a significant proportion of the societies studied by anthropologists, domestic life is
dominated by groupings larger than simple nuclear.., families. Probably the majority
of existing cultures still carry on their domestic routines in the context of some form of
extendedfamily-that is, a domestic group consisting of siblings, their spouses and their
children, and/or parents and married children ....
Id. For examples of such families in different cultures, see id. at 137-38.
130. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
131. Id. at 819-20.
132. See id. at 839.
133. Id. at 842. Under the statute, the agency that placed the child was required to notify the
foster parents 10 days before removing the child from their care; the foster parents could request a
conference with the Social Services Department to voice their opposition to removal. See id. at
829-30 (citing 18 NCRR § 450.10(a)-(b) (1976)). If the child were removed, the foster parents
could appeal for a "fair hearing." Id. at 830. Furthermore, if the child were transferring to another
foster family instead of to his natural parents, the foster parents could (under another regulation)
request a full hearing before removal. Id. at 831. Finally, another safeguard provided that
"[u]nder Soc. Serv. Law § 392, the Family Court ha[d] jurisdiction to review, on petition of the
foster parent or the agency, the status of any child who ha[d] been in foster care for 18 months or
longer." Id.
134. Id. at 844 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 843, 846-47.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan emphasized that both sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the Due Process Clause protect certain
areas of family life from state intrusion.136 The Court also recognized the
importance and existence of the emotional bonds that form in foster fami-
lies13 7 and acknowledged that the foster family is not "a mere collection of
unrelated individuals."' 38 However, the Court distinguished the foster fam-
ily from the natural family in justifying its decision not to address whether
the foster families did indeed have the liberty interest they claimed.' 39
First, the Court explained that foster parents gain their parental powers from
the state. 140 The contractual nature of the relationship removes the foster
family bonds from the traditional recognition of family privacy as an "in-
trinsic human right[ ]."141 The Court noted that because the foster family
relationship is the result of a contract with the state, state law appropriately
sets out the foster parents' expectations and entitlements; 142 part of the con-
tract is the recognition that the placement is temporary. 143
The Court's second reason for skirting the issue of whether foster par-
ents have liberty interests in their relationships with foster children was
based on the difficulty in reconciling such interests with the established
liberty interests of the natural parents. 44 Acknowledging liberty interests
of the foster parents in this case, the Court recognized, would necessarily
conflict with the absolute right of the natural parents to the return of their
children. 45 Without stating conclusively that liberty interests in foster fam-
ilies do not exist, the Court assumed arguendo that such rights do exist and
applied a procedural due process analysis. Finding that the preremoval pro-
cedures were constitutionally adequate, the Court upheld the New York
136. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying note 134.
138. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
139. Id. at 845-46.
140. Id. at 845.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 845-46.
143. Id. at 823-24. But cf id. at 835-36 (noting that many foster children often stay much
longer than the system intends).
144. Id. at 846.
145. Id. The Court noted:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbitrary
governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they have freely
entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law recognition of the
relationship. It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face
of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from blood relation-
ship, state-law sanction, and basic human right-an interest the foster parent has recog-
nized by contract from the outset.
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statute. 14 6 In so holding, the Court declined the opportunity to settle what
was considered a "revolutionary" issue. 47
C. The Unwed Father Cases
Another area in which the Supreme Court has further expanded and
contracted the constitutional boundaries of family rights involves the rights
of unwed fathers.' 48 At common law, an unwed father's right to custody of
his illegitimate child was not legally protected,' 49 as "[tihe law hardly con-
sidered the possibility that an unmarried father might seek to assert pater-
nity rather than escape it."' 50  Instead, the presumption was that unwed
fathers, whose identities were often uncertain, were "irresponsible and un-
concerned about [their children],"'' and thus not entitled to any relation-
ship with them.
146. Id. at 847. To determine what process was due under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court evaluated the elements set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976):
[First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 848-56.
147. See RumrN, supra note 74, at 170. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, relying in part
upon Smith, expressly denied foster parents recognition of a liberty interest in their familial rela-
tionship of several years with their foster child; the state was therefore not required to provide
procedural due process for terminating the relationship and returning the child to her biological
parents. See Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 1993). For a description of facts of
the case and exhaustive list of newspaper articles following each step of this case through 1991,
see James G. O'Keefe, Note, The Need to Consider Children's Rights in Biological Parent v.
Third Party Custody Disputes, 67 Cm.-K Ta L. REv. 1077, 1079-80 & nn.8-27 (1991); see also
James G. Sotos, Foster Parents Learn Bond of Blood is Stronger Than Their Love, Cm. DAILY L.
BuLL., Aug. 5, 1993, at 6 (describing the Seventh Circuit's decision).
148. For the consequences of the resulting ambiguity in the rights of unwed fathers, see infra
notes 267-88 and accompanying text.
149. See Mary K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 65 TrL. L. Rev. 585, 595 (1991); Gregory S. Hilderbran, Comment, In re Baby
Girl Eason: Balancing Three Competing Interests in Third Party Adoptions, 22 GA. L. Rev. 1217,
1219-20 & nn.14-15 & 19 (1988). As one commentator notes,
Various rationales have been proposed to validate the presumption that the mother war-
ranted custodial rights to the exclusion of the putative father. Such reasons include the
pragmatic notion that the mother can be easily identified and located and that a mother
is socially recognized as being primarily responsible for the care and maintenance of her
child. Still another rationale is premised on the natural love and affection that presuma-
bly exists between a mother and her child.
Hilderbran, supra, at 1220.
150. IRA M. EuMaN er AL., FAMILY LAW 912 (2d ed. 1991).
151. Donald L. Swanson, Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights: A Focus on "Family,"
58 NEB. L. REv. 610, 611 (1979).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The rights of unwed fathers were first constitutionalized in 1972 in
Stanley v. Illinois,5 2 the first of five Supreme Court cases addressing un-
wed fathers' rights. 5 3 In Stanley, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a statute that denied an unwed biological father custody of his children
after their mother died. 54 Because the statute did not include the unwed
father in its definition of "parent," '155 no showing of unfitness was required
before a child became a ward of the state.156 Rather, the statute conclu-
sively presumed the unwed father unfit to have custody of his child.15 7
Although Stanley was the biological father of the three children and had
helped their biological mother raise them,'58 he was not a "parent" under
the statute because he was not, and had never been, married to the
mother. 159
The Court evaluated Stanley's claim that the statute violated both his
procedural due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. First evaluating the procedural due process claim, the Court
identified Stanley's private interest as "that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised"' 6° and noted that such an interest is at least "cognizable
and substantial."' 61 The Court held that while the state has a legitimate
interest in protecting the welfare of children and strengthening family ties
by removing the child from his parents only when the child's or the public's
safety mandated removal, the presumption of unfitness was not "constitu-
tionally defensible."1 62 The Court noted that if the father is fit, as Stanley
was in this case, the state "spites its own articulated goals" with the pre-
sumption of unfitness.' 63 Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that
the presumption was defensible on administrative convenience grounds.1 6 4
Finally, a.plurality held that denying Stanley a hearing prior to terminating
his parental rights violated the Equal Protection Clause because other par-
152. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
153. See infra notes 167-228 and accompanying text for a discussion of the other four cases.
154. 405 U.S. at 645.
155. Id. at 650. The Illinois statute defined "parents" as "the father and mother of a legitimate
child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child and.., any adoptive
parent." Id. (quoting ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1967)).
156. Id. at 646.
157. Id. at 648.
158. Id. at 646.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 651.
161. Id. at 652. The court added that "[t]he private interest here . . . undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 651.
162. Id. at 653.
163. Id. The Court also noted that the state's interest would be "de minimis" if Stanley were
a fit parent. ld. at 658-59.
164. Id. at 656-58. The Court reiterated that the state's interest in speed and efficiency would
be undermined if Stanley were shown to be fit. Id. at 654-55.
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ents were afforded such a hearing before their children were removed from
their custody.' 65 Holding the statute unconstitutional, Stanley thus marked
the Court's first recognition that the father of an illegitimate child has a
constitutionally protected interest in his parent-child relationship.166
The Court further expanded the rights of unwed fathers in Caban v.
Mohammed,'67 which declared unconstitutional a New York statute that did
not require the biological father's consent before a child could be adopted
by a stepparent. 68 In Caban, the biological father's rights were terminated
when the natural mother and her new husband adopted the two children
Caban had fathered out of wedlock.' 69 Caban was identified on their birth
certificates as the father, however, and "[had] lived with the children as
their father" for more than four years. 170 While Caban maintained contact
with the children and had been granted visitation rights, 7 ' those rights ter-
minated when the stepfather adopted the children.' 72
Under the challenged statute, a mother could freely block the adoption
of her child, but the unwed biological father could do so only if he could
show the adoption was not in the child's best interests. 73 Such a gender-
based distinction can survive scrutiny only if the distinction "serve[s] im-
portant governmental objectives" and is "substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."' 7 4 The Court rejected the state's first argument
that the distinction was justified by some "fundamental difference between
maternal and paternal relations."'175 The Court emphasized that while such
a distinction may be valid when the child is born, the generalization would
be less acceptable as the child grew older and the father had an opportunity
165. Id. at 658 (plurality opinion). Without so stating, the Court appeared to apply a mere
rationality test in evaluating the equal protection challenge. Id. The dissent contended that the
case presented only an equal protection issue. Finding Stanley to be an unusual father, the dissent
stated that unwed fathers are justifiably treated differently than mothers, because unwed mothers
are readily identifiable, have stronger bonds with their infants, and exhibit concern for their off-
spring until permanent placement or adoption. Id. at 665 (Burger, J., dissenting). Unwed fathers,
on the other hand, are often unknown and difficult to locate, deny responsibility for or show little
interest in the child, and, in many cases, "rarely burden the mother or the child with their atten-
tions or loyalties." Id. at 665-66 (Burger, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 648-51. For an extensive list of sources discussing the Stanley decision, see Kis-
thardt, supra note 149, at 597 n.92 .
167. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
168. Id. at 381-82. Under the statute, the mother could "block the adoption of her child sim-
ply by withholding consent." Id. at 386.
169. Id. at 382.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 382-83.
172. Id. at 383-84.
173. Id. at 386-87.
174. Id. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
175. Id. at 388.
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to establish a relationship with her.176 The Court also rejected the alterna-
tive argument that the distinction is substantially related to the state's inter-
est in providing for the welfare of illegitimate children by facilitating
adoption.' 77 According to the Court, unwed fathers are not necessarily
more likely than unwed mothers to object to such adoptions. 178 In response
to the argument that unwed fathers are difficult to find, the Court stated that
when the father has demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood, his identity would be apparent and the justification for treat-
ing him differently than the mother would no longer stand.179 Emphasizing
that the New York statute failed to differentiate between fathers who had
not established a relationship with their children and those who had, the
Court held that the statute's gender-based distinction between biological
mothers and fathers was not substantially related to the state's interest in
providing for the welfare of illegitimate children.18 0
The decisions in both Stanley and Caban support the proposition that a
biological relationship coupled with an actual relationship between an un-
wed father and his child warrants protection under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8" The Court has
been less willing to extend constitutional protection to those biological fa-
176. Id. at 389-91. The Court explained that a father who has established a relationship with
his child can have a relationship comparable to that between the mother and child. Id.
177. Id. The Court did, however, agree that this interest was "important." Id. at 391.
178. Id. at 392.
179. Id. at 393. The Court noted, however, that when "the father never has come forward to
participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State
from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." Id. at 392.
180. Id. at 391-93. The Court stated:
We do not question that the best interests of such children often may require their adop-
tion into new families who will give them the stability of a normal, two-parent
home. ... But the unquestioned right of the State to further these desirable ends by
legislation is not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction ....
Id.
In dissent, Justice Stewart distinguished Stanley. Id. at 396 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He
focused on the best interests determination of the adoption proceeding and the importance of
allowing children to be adopted:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent
and child. They require relationships more enduring .... By tradition, the primary
measure has been the legitimate familial relationship (the father] creates with the child
by marriage with the mother. By definition, the question before us can arise only when
no such marriage has taken place.
Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Echoing the dissent in Stanley, Justice Stewart justified treat-
ing unwed mothers differently than unwed fathers by arguing that most unwed fathers were absent
or uninterested. Id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also focused on the inherent
differences between men and women: "Both parents are equally responsible for the conception of
the child out of wedlock. But from that point on through pregnancy and infancy, the differences
between the male and female have an important impact on the child's destiny." Id. at 404 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
181. See supra notes 152-80 and accompanying text.
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thers who have not formed such a relationship with the child. 82 In another
pair of cases, the Supreme Court denied unwed fathers protection of paren-
tal rights that would allow them to develop relationships with their children
when they had not already done so. In Quilloin v. Walcott,i1 3 decided one
year before Caban,184 the Court attempted to answer a question left open in
Stanley: what to do when the state has a substantial, as opposed to de
minimis, countervailing interest in the child's welfare.' 85 The Court re-
sponded by rejecting the biological father's claim to a constitutionally pro-
tected right to parenthood, even absent unfitness, and suggested that
biology alone is insufficient to protect an unwed father's parental rights.1
8 6
Quilloin, an unwed father who wished to secure visitation rights with his
child, challenged a Georgia statute that denied him the right to block the
adoption of his illegitimate child. 18 7 The statute granted such power to the
mother and father of a legitimate child, even if the father was divorced or
separated from the mother.' When the mother of Quilloin's child con-
sented to the child's adoption by the stepfather, the trial court found the
adoption to be in the child's best interests.' 8 9 Quilloin contended that the
statute as applied to him violated both the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 90
In analyzing Quilloin's claim that the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard violated his substantive due process rights, the Court focused on Quil-
loin's lack of interest in obtaining custody of his child and the positive
effect of allowing the adoption by the child's stepfather. 191 Because Quil-
loin had not established a strong relationship with his child and had never
sought actual or legal custody, the Court held that the "best interests of the
child" standard did not violate his due process rights.1 92 Instead, the appli-
cation of the standard preserved an existing family, "a result desired by all,
except [Quilloin]."' 193
182. See infra notes 183-209 and accompanying text.
183. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
184. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
185. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248.
186. Id. at 256.
187. Id. at 248-49. Unless the father legitimated the child by marrying the mother or ob-
taining a court order, only the mother could veto the adoption. Id. at 249.
188. Id. at 248-49.
189. Id. at 251. The trial court based its finding on the irregularity of Quilloin's visits, the
disruptive effect the mother felt the visits had on the child and family, the wishes of the child to be
adopted by his stepfather, and the "fitness" of the stepfather. Id. at 251.
190. Id. at 252.
191. Id. at 255.
192. Id. at 254.
193. Id. at 255.
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Furthermore, in evaluating Quilloin's equal protection claim, the Court
found justification for the statute's distinction between divorced fathers and
unwed fathers.1 94 Whereas divorced or separated fathers generally had es-
tablished at least some relationship with their children, including taking
some responsibility in their upbringing, Quilloin had "never shouldered any
significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of the child." 195 Concluding that such unwed fathers
were "readily distinguishable" from the fathers protected by the statute, the
Court held that Quilloin had not been deprived of his equal protection
rights. 196
Further supporting the implication that biology alone does not ensure
protection of a father's interests in the parent-child relationship, the Court
in Lehr v. Robertson197 held that an unwed father's procedural due process
and equal protection rights were not violated even though he was not given
notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to his child's adoption by
her natural mother and stepfather. 98 As in Quilloin, the father in Lehr did
not take adequate steps to legitimate his child; he did not list his name with
the putative father registry, nor was his name on the child's birth certifi-
cate. 199 He was therefore not entitled under the statute to either notice of
the adoption proceeding or an opportunity to contest the adoption.2"0
In its analysis of Lehr's due process challenge, the Court began by
emphasizing that parental rights are inextricably linked to parental duties-
that "the rights of parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have
assumed." 0' Distinguishing the fathers in Stanley and Caban, the Court
noted the difference between actual and potential relationships and held that
a father has a liberty interest in his relationship with his child only when he
194. Id. at 256. This distinction, unlike the gender-based distinction in the statute in Caban,
warrants a lower standard of review-a rational relation to furthering the state's goals. The Court
concluded, however, that "[u]nder any standard of review, the State was not foreclosed from
recognizing this difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child." Id. The
Court noted that although Quilloin had previously raised the claim of a gender-based distinction in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court did not address the claim because he did not
present it in his jurisdictional statement. Id. at 253 n.13.
195. Id. at 256. The Court further noted that the stepfather had been part of the family unit, id.
at 247, and that Quilloin had failed to take steps to legitimate his child for over 11 years, id. at 249.
196. Id.
197. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
198. Id. at 256-65.
199. Id. at 251-52. Listing his name with the registry and appearing on the child's birth certif-
icate were two of seven ways an unwed father could ensure that he automatically would be enti-
fled to prior notice of adoption proceedings. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 (a)(2)-(3) (McKinney
1977 & Supp. 1982 & 1983). The statute also included, among others, those fathers who held
themselves out as the child's father and lived openly with the mother. Id.
200. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52.
201. Id. at 257-58.
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"demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child.' "202 The Court
stated that the biological relationship is significant only in that it provides
the father the opportunity to come forward and establish such a relation-
ship.203 The Court held that a father who has not come forward to usurp the
opportunity interest is not entitled to procedural due process protection. 2"
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the opportunity interest itself was
adequately protected by New York's statutory procedures, which gave fa-
thers several options to establish paternity.2 °5
The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim that the statute
drew an arbitrary distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in
determining who was permitted to veto an adoption and who was entitled to
notification of the proceedings.20 6 Although not all unwed fathers were en-
titled to notification or an opportunity to be heard, the mother had unques-
tioned authority to block the adoption.20 7  Citing Quilloin and
distinguishing Caban, the Court emphasized that Lehr was not "similarly
situated" with the mother because he had not established a relationship with
his child.20 ' The Court concluded that the statute, by differentiating be-
tween those fathers who had shown parental responsibility toward their
children and those who had not, bore a substantial relation to the govern-
mental objectives of "promot[ing] the best interests of the child .... pro-
tect[ing] the rights of interested third parties, and . . . ensur[ing]
promptness and finality."2 9 The Court thus upheld the constitutionality of
the gender-based distinction.
These four unwed father cases, analyzed together, seem to stand for
the proposition that while biology alone will not ensure recognition or pro-
202. Id. at 261 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)). The Court noted
that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."
Id.
203. Id. at 262 ("If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for
the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development."). For a discussion of whether this opportunity
interest is worthy of constitutional protection, see Laurel J. Eveleigh, Comment, Certainly Not
Child's Play: A Serious Game of Hide and Seek with the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 SYRACUsE
L. REv. 1055, 1079-81 (1989).
204. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
205. Id. at 264; see also supra note 199. The Court also rejected Lehr's claim that he was
"nevertheless entitled to special notice because the court and the mother knew that he had filed an
affiliation proceeding in another court." Id. at 264-65. The Court stated that "[tihe legitimate
state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding
completed expeditiously... justify a... determination to require all interested parties to adhere
precisely to the procedural requirements of the statute." Id.
206. Id. at 255, 265-68.
207. Id. at 255, 266.
208. Id. at 267-68.
209. Id. at 266.
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tection of parental rights, the interests of a biological father who has estab-
lished a substantial relationship with his child deserve constitutional
protection. However, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,21° the most recent
Supreme Court case addressing the rights of putative fathers, a plurality
upheld a California statute that denied an unwed father who had a relation-
ship with his child the opportunity to establish paternity.211 The challenged
statute conclusively presumed the legitimacy of a child born to a woman
cohabiting with her husband, as long as he was not impotent or sterile.2 lz
Michael H., the father in this case, had an adulterous affair with the appel-
lee's wife and subsequently lived with the wife and the child he fathered for
a number of years.213 He developed a "personal and emotional relation-
ship" '214 with his daughter, "who grew up calling him 'Daddy.' "215 He also
held her out "as his daughter and contributed to the child's financial
support. 216
Rejecting Michael H.'s claim that the presumption which prevented
him from establishing paternity violated his procedural due process rights,
the Court explained that the presumption was actually a "substantive rule of
law."'217 The Court thus focused on the substantive due process issues re-
garding Michael H.'s right to the paternal relationship.2" 8 Relying on the
Court's reasoning in the four previous unwed father cases,219 Michael H.
argued that his biological tie, coupled with his actual relationship with his
daughter, invoked a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest.22  The
plurality noted that in creating new constitutional rights, it was bound by its
previous insistence "not merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty'
be 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also
that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society. '221 The plurality
210. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
211. Id. at 124 (plurality opinion).
212. Id. at 113, 117 (plurality opinion). See CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989). This
presumption was developed at common law "to protect the child from the harsh results that flowed
from a finding of illegitimacy and to stabilize family relationships." Kisthardt, supra note 149, at
589. In England, the rule could be rebutted only by a showing of impotence at the time of concep-
tion and was otherwise conclusive if the mother's husband was in the country when the child was
conceived. Id. The evidentiary rule supporting the presumption was known as Lord Mansfield's
Rule, which precluded a man from establishing paternity of a child even if both the mother and
her husband testified that he was the father. See Hill, supra note 115, at 373.
213. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-14 (plurality opinion).
214. Id. at 159 (White, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 114 (plurality opinion) (describing Michael H.'s
involvement in his daughter's life).
216. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 119-21 (plurality opinion).
218. Id. at 121-30 (plurality opinion).
219. Id. at 121-23 (plurality opinion).
220. Id. at 123 (plurality opinion).
221. Id. at 122 (plurality opinion).
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then stated that Michael H.'s reading of the unwed father cases distorted the
Court's rationale.222 The plurality explained that the decisions were based
"upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a
term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family." '223 Emphasizing that history has protected the marital fam-
ily, but not the familial relationship between Michael H. and his daughter,
the Court stated that Michael H.'s interest in his relationship with his
daughter was not a constitutionally protected liberty interest.224 The plural-
ity thus held that the presumption does not infringe on the substantive due
process rights of the biological father, even when the father has established
a relationship with his child.2 2"
Victoria, Michael H.'s daughter, also advanced due process and equal
protection arguments. The Court quickly rejected her due process claim that
she had a right to maintain a parent-child relationship with both fathers, as
"multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this coun-
try." '226 Furthermore, the Court applied a "rational relationship" test to her
claim that she was denied equal protection because, unlike her mother and
mother's husband, she was not able to rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy.227 The plurality held that the state's interest in preserving the integ-
222. Id. (plurality opinion).
223. Id. (plurality opinion).
224. Id. at 124-30 (plurality opinion). The Court found that Michael H. had not been denied
an interest "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal."' Id. at 122 (plurality opinion) (quoting Snyder v. Massachussetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
In addition, the plurality considered the importance of the policies behind the presumption of
legitimacy-among them "an aversion to declaring children illegitimate" and "the interest in pro-
moting the 'peace and tranquility of states and families.'" Id. at 124-25 (plurality opinion). The
Court considered neither the relationship between father and child, nor the fact that severing such
a longstanding relationship would emotionally and psychologically affect the child. The Court
thus subrogated the interests of the child and the father to the interests of some traditional notion
of "family."
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's steadfast reliance on history and tradition in
its determination that no liberty interest was at stake in this case:
Even if we can agree... that "family" and "parenthood" are part of the good life, it is
absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to
pretend that we do. In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom
not to conform. The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific ap-
proval from history before protecting anything in the name of liberty.
Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plurality responded to Justice Brennan's criticism by
stating that "to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital
father, and vice versa." Id. at 130 (plurality opinion). Brennan also read the decisions in the four
unwed father cases as standing for the proposition that "although an unwed father's biological link
to his child does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with
that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so." Id. at
142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
226. Id. at 130-31 (plurality opinion).
227. Id. at 131 (plurality opinion).
1306 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
rity of the family is a legitimate end rationally served by disallowing
anyone other than the husband and wife to rebut the presumption.228
Although the holding in Michael H. seemed to stray from earlier deci-
sions protecting the rights of unwed fathers who had established relation-
ships with their children, the plurality affirmed the notion that biology is not
determinative and adhered to its traditional preference for the unitary fam-
ily. The question of whose interests will be protected in the future, how-
ever, remains unanswered. The five unwed father cases, in addition to
Moore and Smith, have left the Supreme Court, as well as state courts, with
the ability to deny unwed fathers and other parental figures protection in
their family relationships.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FAMILY
INTERESTS IN THE THIRD PARTY ADOPTION CONTEXT
A. Do Prospective Adoptive Parents Have a Liberty Interest in the
Protection of Their "Family"?
Under statutory authority, the process of adoption transfers legal rights
and responsibilities from the natural parents to the adopting couple. 29 In
various situations, however, the adoptive parents may find themselves in
"legal limbo" 23°-the period when the adoptive parents have physical cus-
tody "but the newly formed family has not been granted permanent sta-
tus."23 In this "limbo" period, the prospective adoptive parents are neither
part of a constitutionally protected family, nor are they strangers. They
become family to the child, who often knows no other parents.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether prospective adoptive
parents have a protected liberty interest in relationships with the children
they have reared. 32 By refusing to hear the Baby Jessica case, the Court
228. Id. (plurality opinion) ("When the husband or wife contests the legitimacy of their child,
the stability of the marriage has already been shaken.... [Aillowing a claim of illegitimacy to be
pressed by the child... may well disrupt an otherwise peaceful union.").
229. Hilderbran, supra note 149, at 1229.
230. Id. at 1230. "Legal limbo" has also been described from the perspective of the child,
who may find herself "in a state of psychological torture," when the biological parents have aban-
doned her but have refused to give her up for adoption. Eckstein, supra note 7, at 379.
231. H-ilderbran, supra note 149, at 1230. This situation may arise after the natural parents
have consented to the adoption and surrendered their parental rights. The prospective adoptive
parents are in limbo during the period between the petition for adoption and the adoption decree.
In other instances, such as the Baby Jessica case, the adoption decree cannot be granted, or is
revoked, when the biological father contests the adoption on the grounds that his rights have not
been terminated. See DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. App. 1993).
232. Hilderbran, supra note 149, at 1229 ("While protection for the family realm is firmly
embedded in our legal tradition, the boundaries of this sphere blur when we focus on the novel
issue of what fundamental rights attach to the prospective adopting family."). Because many
states limit who may bring an action for custody or termination of parental rights to the exclusion
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avoided facing such a difficult determination.2 3 The Michigan Supreme
Court quickly dismissed the DeBoers' argument, based upon the reasoning
in the putative father cases, that they had a liberty interest in their relation-
ship with Jessica.234 Although the Michigan court found that contention
meritless,2 35 a closer examination of their argument is necessary to under-
stand the plight of adoptive parents. The DeBoers based their argument
upon the first four unwed father cases, in which the court protected the
interests of only those biological fathers who had established an actual rela-
tionship with their children. 36 The DeBoers claimed "that it is the relation-
ship between the parent and child that triggers significant constitutional
protection and that the mere existence of a biological link is not determina-
tive."237 They argued that their relationship with Jessica therefore deserved
such protection.238
The argument that the reasoning in the putative father cases affords
constitutional protection to prospective adoptive parents is limited. While
consistently holding that biology is not the sole factor in triggering such
protection,239 the Court has not insinuated that any of these men would
have had constitutionally protected rights absent any biological connection.
In Stanley, the Court for the first time recognized that an unwed father may
have a protected liberty interest in his relationship with his child.240 While
that right has its basis in biology, as reconfirmed in Lehr, Caban, and Quil-
loin, a liberty interest is not activated absent the existence of an actual
relationship.24'
Support for the prospective adoptive parents' liberty interest may be
found, however, between the lines of Michael H. v. Gerald D.242 The plu-
rality's emphasis on respect for the sanctity of the "unitary family" led it to
of prospective adopters, determining whether prospective adoptive parents have such a liberty
interest may be crucial. In many cases, these limits preclude prospective adoptive parents from
bringing such actions even though they have established a psychological, familial relationship
with the child. A related issue is whether prospective adopters have fundamental rights with
regard to creating a family. See Miller, supra note 7, at 788-93 (arguing that adoption should be
considered a liberty interest).
233. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
234. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 663 (Mich. 1993).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 152-209 and accompanying text.
237. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 663.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., supra note 202 and accompanying text. The actual relationship thus was not
the basis for the protection.
242. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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deny Michael H., the child's natural father, visitation rights to his child.243
In the case of a prospective adoption in which the mother has eliminated the
possibility of a unitary family by revoking her consent to the adoption, the
adoptive family may then become the family deserving protection. 2 " At a
minimum, the prospective adoptive parents' interests should be recognized
such that they are not denied standing to participate in custody disputes
involving nonconsenting biological fathers.
Another Supreme Court case, Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies,245 further supports the argument that prospective adoptive parents who
have established a relationship with the child have a liberty interest in that
relationship. 46 In Smith, the Court left open the question of whether foster
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in their relationship with their
foster children that would invoke Fourteenth Amendment protection.247
The Court's recognition that emotional ties forming the basis for the family
may exist in relationships other than blood relationships248 is the premise
upon which to start building an argument like the DeBoers'.249 As in the
foster parent situation, prospective adoptive parents who have lived to-
gether for a significant period of time with the children they seek to adopt
often develop strong emotional and psychological ties with "their" chil-
dren-ties that can be as strong as those existing in blood relationships. 2 °
243. Id. at 123-24. The plurality's holding was based on traditional principles-protecting
children from the stigma of illegitimacy and preserving their stable home lives-that support
recognizing the rights of prospective adoptive parents.
244. This Comment does not propose that in all circumstances the father's interest should not
be protected, but rather suggests that adoptive parents who have established a relationship with
their child deserve some protection. Furthermore, recognizing that prospective adoptive parents
have a liberty interest in their familial relationships does not necessarily invite any temporary
custodian or even a close family friend to assert these interests. The prospective adoptive family
is special because it is intended to be a permanent family replacement.
245. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
246. Id. at 845-47.
247. Id. Other courts have relied on Smith in holding that foster parents do not have a liberty
interest in their relationship with their foster children. See, e.g., Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family &
Child Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Sherrard v.
Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728,741 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'dper curiam, 644 F.2d 542, 543 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981); cf. Gibson v. Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799
F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to decide whether foster parents have liberty interests and
finding that the state's removal procedure was adequate to protect whatever liberty interest they
might have).
248. See supra text accompanying note 131.
249. One commentator referred to Smith as "a takeoff point for considering 'which attributes
of the family are essential to the attainment of constitutional protection."' Bruce C. Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. Rv. 463, 503 (quoting Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1273 (1980)).
250. See JOsEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., BEYOND THE BFsT INTERETS OF THE CHILD 26 (new ed.
1979).
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Because severing these ties can be devastating to the child," 1 adoptive fam-
ilies deserve some degree of protection.
Although the Court may try to extend Smith's holding to adoptive par-
ents, its reasons for declining to recognize a liberty interest in foster parents
do not apply as well to prospective adoptive parents. First, although the
state may have a role in the formation of both families, the contractual na-
ture of the foster family is much more restrictive than that of the adoptive
family. While the foster family is the state's temporary solution to what
may be either a short-term or long-term inability of parents to care ade-
quately for their children, 2 the adoptive family is intended, by all of the
parties, to be a permanent solution to the problem. 53  A contract defines
the rights and privileges of foster parents, who therefore know from the
outset that placement is not permanent. 54 In fact, foster parents are cau-
tioned not to develop strong bonds with the children, and such attachment
may be grounds for removal from a particular foster family.5 Adoptive
parents, on the other hand, have an expectation of permanency that is more
than reasonable." 6 Once an adoption is legally finalized, the adoptive fam-
ily gains all of the rights of a natural family. 7
At least one court has recognized the special nature of parents and
children seeking to form a family through adoption. A Wisconsin district
court held that the prospective adoptive parents had a limited, constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in their family unit during the six-month pre-
adoption period when the child lived in their home.5 8 The court found that
251. Id. at 20. Proponents of attachment theory argue that a child who is separated from her
primary caregiver may be psychologically traumatized, particularly if the separation occurs during
the child's pre-school years. See O'Keefe, supra note 147, at 1102.
252. E.g., Carolyn Curtis, Comment, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes
Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRons. 149, 150 (1980).
253. Once the decree is final, the adoptive parents are the legal parents, and the biological
parents no longer have any rights to their children. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 606.
254. See Miller, supra note 7, at 796.
255. Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 861 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that emotional attachments formed between foster parents and
foster children signify a failure of the foster care system); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family & Child Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "the only time potential
parents could assert a liberty interest as psychological parents would be when they had developed
precisely the relationship which state law warns against the [sic] the foster context"), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 910 (1978). The court in Drummond stated:
The very fact that the relationship.., is a creature of state law, as well as the fact that it
has never been recognized as equivalent to either the natural family or the adoptive
family by any court, demonstrates that it is not a protected liberty interest, but an interest
limited by the very laws which create it.
Id.
256. Smith, 431 U.S. at 824; see Miller, supra note 7, at 796-97.
257. 431 U.S. at 844 n.51.
258. Thelen v. Catholic Social Servs., 691 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (E.D. Wis. 1988). The court
distinguished the prospective adoptive parents from the foster parents in Kyees v. County Dep't of
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"the very motive of the prospective adoptive parents, as well as the State, is
to secure a life-long relationship between the adoptive parents and the
child." 9 As in Smith, however, the court found that the preremoval hear-
ing afforded adequate process. Thus, the court held that the prospective
adoptive parents enjoyed limited constitutional protection but were not enti-
tled to a preremoval hearing during the first six months of placement if the
state decided that removal was in the child's best interests.260
The Court's second argument in Smith was that liberty interests of fos-
ter parents cannot coexist with the firmly established liberty interests of the
natural parents.26' The natural parents' liberty interest derives from "blood
relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right-an interest the fos-
ter parent has recognized by contract from the outset. 2z62 In adoption pro-
ceedings, however, natural parents, upon consent, expressly give up such
rights. The rights of prospective adoptive parents would not be pitted
against those of natural parents who expected their child back, but would
instead coexist with those of a parent who either never knew of his child's
existence or never assumed parental responsibility.
Closely related to the argument that the actual parent-child relation-
ships that form in families intended to be permanent do, or should, trigger
constitutional protection, is the contention that the status of prospective
adoptive parents as "psychological parents"2 63 should be protected. The
Court in Smith avoided considering the foster parents' argument that their
role as "psychological parents" deserved protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2" Similarly, the Lehr Court declined to "take sides in the
ongoing debate among family psychologists over the relative weight to be
accorded biological ties and psychological ties, in ... recogniz[ing] that a
natural father who has played a substantial role in rearing his child has a
greater claim to constitutional protection than a mere biological parent." 265
The Court did not address whether a psychological parent could have a
Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1979), in which the Seventh Circuit relied on Smith to
deny foster parents a protected liberty interest in their relationship with their children. Id. at 1184.
259. Id. at 1184.
260. Id. at 1186.
261. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
262. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977).
263. For a discussion of the principles of the theory of "psychological parentage," see infra
notes 326-29 and accompanying text. The theory has gained recognition in several lower courts in
custody determinations. See generally Richard E. Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial
Reception of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979) (examining the social
and legal responses to the book and the theory of psychological parentage).
264. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-45 n.52; cf. J. Hammond Muench & Martin R. Levy, Psycho-
logical Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAm. L.Q. 129, 181 (1979) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court breached its responsibility by failing "to consider arguments of psychological parentage as a
substantive due process right of foster children").
265. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 n.18 (1983).
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greater claim to constitutional protection than an unwed biological father
who had made no attempt to establish paternity or a relationship with his
child. Recognizing liberty interests based on the psychological parent doc-
trine would require the Court to shift its focus from tradition and history to
a recognition that the social sciences support a definition of family apart
from a biologically created unit.266 While such a shift would leave the
Court wading into new territory in a predominantly state-regulated area, an
acknowledgement that the meaning of family has evolved and expanded
would require states to broaden their definition of family as well.
B. The Undecided Status of Unwed Fathers
Until 1972, an unwed father's rights to receive notice of and consent to
the adoption of his child were not afforded protection by the procedural due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.267 States were free to
terminate an unwed father's parental rights when the mother of the child
consented to the adoption.2 68  After the Supreme Court's decision in Stan-
ley v. Illinois,2 69 however, states enacting adoption statutes were unsure
how to treat unwed fathers,270 because the case left unclear when notice and
277
consent were necessary.Y1 Some states assumed that all biological fathers
had to be notified before their parental rights were terminated,272 while
others assumed that only those fathers who had established a relationship
with their children were entitled to notice. 3  Although the Court at-
tempted in subsequent cases to clarify the extent to which unwed fathers'
interests in their children are constitutionally protected, the decisions in
266. The Court's refusal to consider the psychological parent argument is consistent with its
reluctance to stray from strict traditional concepts, especially when dealing with the emotion-laden
area of family law.
267. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 572; Marianne M. DeMarco, Comment, Delineation of the
Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood Perspective, 15 SErON
HALL L. REv. 290, 297 (1985).
268. DeMarco, supra note 267, at 297. Before Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), states
were free to deny notice of adoption to all putative fathers. DeMarco, supra note 267, at 297. In
addition, most adoption statutes did not require the putative father's consent to the adoption. Id.
Rationales ranged from punishing the unwed father for his sins to protecting the welfare of the
child by assuming that such fathers were unfit parents. Id.
269. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
270. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 574-75.
271. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; see also 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 574 (noting the Court's incon-
sistencies in recognizing constitutional protection of an unwed father's parental rights only when
he had established a relationship with his child, and then recommending service even to unknown
fathers).
272. See Nora L. Freeman, Remodeling Adoption Statutes After Stanley v. Illinois, 15 J. FAr.
L. 385, 385 (1976-77) (discussing the attempts of New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan to
comply with Stanley).
273. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.040-050 (Michie 1993).
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Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. leave these rights ambiguous.2 74
The states therefore have wide discretion to acknowledge or limit those
rights in enacting and enforcing their statutes.275
Further confusing the issue is that the Supreme Court has yet to con-
sider the rights of unwed fathers in the third-party adoption context.276 Be-
cause the rights of unwed fathers remained unclear even in situations
addressed by the Court,27 7 such status is less evident in novel situations,
such as third-party adoption of infants with whom the father has had no
opportunity to establish a relationship.278 The first four unwed father cases
seem to stand for the proposition that while biological relationship alone is
not sufficient to establish the father's constitutional rights, a biological tie
coupled with a substantial relationship with the child results in a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest.279 An unwed father's equal protection
274. See Joan C. Sylvain, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39
CATH. U. L. REv. 831, 832 & n.8 (1990); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The
Unwed Father's Right to Raise his Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 971,
972 (1992). One commentator noted that "despite its many opportunities to establish solid legal
principles which could be used to settle foreseeable legal issues in disputes involving children
who have been born outside of marriage, the Supreme Court has failed to do so." Linda R. Crane,
Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REv. 427, 448-49 (1993).
275. See Bartlett, supra note 110, at 316-17 & nn.95-102. Some state statutes make consent
unnecessary if the father has not established paternity-either by formal acknowledgement, see,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206(a)(2) (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.062(1)(b)(4),
63.072 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993), or judicial decree, see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-
6(g)(2)(A) (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1993)-or provided consistent care or financial support, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9.3-46 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11l(l)(d) (McKinney 1988).
276. The Court avoided this opportunity when it dismissed McNamara v. County of San Di-
ego Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152, 152 (1988), for lack of a federal question. In McNa-
mara, the biological father challenged the constitutionality of a statute that allowed "a trial court
to terminate his parental rights despite the court's findings that he would be a fit parent, and that
he had manifested significant interest in obtaining custody upon learning of his child's birth."
Stacy L. Hill, Putative Fathers and Parental Interests: A Search for Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939,
939 (1990) (citing In re Baby Girl M, 688 P.2d 918, 920 (Cal. 1984), cert. dismissed sub nom.
McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988)). For an analysis
of the decisions in the different phases of the case, as well as California's statutory scheme, see
Eveleigh, supra note 203, at 1068-85.
277. See supra notes 152-228 and accompanying text.
278. See Zinman, supra note 274, at 972, 974; see also John R. Hamilton, Note, The Unwed
Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 971 n.202 (1987-88)
(noting the ages of the children in the unwed father cases). This issue was addressed in In re
Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990), in which the court
held that an unwed father could block the adoption of his newborn if he promptly assumed paren-
tal responsibility, including a willingness to take custody of the infant. Id. at 424-25. The court
did not address the problem of reconciling the father's interests with the interests of the child who
has already been in the custody of adoptive parents with whom she has established an emotional
and psychological attachment. See Zinman, supra note 274, at 973.
279. See supra notes 152-209 and accompanying text. But cf. Hill, supra note 276, at 957-58
(suggesting that the biological bond between father and child should be considered an independent
basis for constitutional protection).
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argument thus depends on his ability to establish that he is the biological
father and that he has developed a substantial relationship with the child.
Although modem technology makes establishing paternity a fairly expedi-
ent and accurate process, 280 the "biology-plus" 28 1 or substantial relationship
test seems insurmountable in third-party adoptions of newborn infants.2 82
Presumably, an unwed father in this situation would never be considered
"similarly situated" with the mother, because he would not have had an
opportunity to establish a relationship with the child.28 3 An alternative in-
terpretation of the substantial relationship test, however, suggests that a fa-
ther could satisfy such a test by establishing a relationship with the mother
or by expressing interest in his child before or at birth.284 A father who
manifests the intention of taking responsibility for his child may be deserv-
ing of the "opportunity" interest described in Lehr v. Robertson.285
The unwed father's procedural due process rights with respect to no-
tice of his child's adoption and the termination of his rights are also ob-
scured by the substantial relationship test,286 because the father of a young
280. See Kisthardt, supra note 149, at 594; Sylvain, supra note 274, at 831 n.l.
281. Zinman, supra note 274, at 975-79.
282. See Hill, supra note 276, at 961 & n.173. '"he problem with th[e] 'relationship' stan-
dard is that it places putative fathers in an almost no-win situation in cases involving newborn
children." Id at 961.
283. The Equal Protection Clause thus would not preclude a state from limiting such a father's
rights. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) ("If one parent has an established
custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established
a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two par-
ents different legal rights." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 392 (noting that "nothing in the
Equal Protection Clause precludes the state from withholding from... [the father who has not
come forward to assert parental responsibility] the privilege of vetoing the adoption of his child").
284. These fathers would then deserve notice of the adoption and the opportunity to withhold
consent, but only if they intended to assume custody. Cf. id. at 257 ("["]he rights of the parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.").
285. Id. at 262; see also Eveleigh, supra note 203, at 1079-81 (suggesting that the opportunity
interest must be viewed as a constitutionally protected right). This opportunity interest deserves
protection when the unwed father (1) is willing to take custody of the child, (2) manifests his
commitment and intentions in a timely manner, and (3) "take[s] advantage of whatever statutory
process the state afford[s] in order to protect his opportunity interest." Id. at 1080. Although
some courts have decided that the unwed father opportunity interest need not be protected, see,
e.g., In re Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 945 (Idaho 1986), others have held that it must be, see, e.g.,
In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga. 1987).
286. See supra note 146 for the procedural due process factors set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
One commentator states that "[i]t can safely be assumed that the policies underlying the due
process clause tend to favor affording an individual the opportunity to develop a liberty interest
over denying such an opportunity to the individual.' See Hamilton, supra note 309, at 988. Ironi-
cally, in Lehr the Court upheld a statute denying the unwed father notice and opportunity to be
heard at his child's adoption proceeding even though he had attempted to assert responsibility for
the child before and after the child's birth, but was thwarted by the mother. Lehr, 436 U.S. at 268-
76 (White. J., dissenting). The Court focused on the child's existing family relationship, rather
than the fault of either parent. See Bartlett, supra note 110, at 319 & nn.111-16.
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infant will not have had the opportunity to establish such a relationship. In
the easy case, the father is readily identifiable and has in some way estab-
lished paternity. While the Due Process Clause seems to protect these fa-
thers' rights, the issue becomes more complicated when the father is not
aware of the infant's existence.287 Even further confusing this area is the
question of fault-whether fathers who have been thwarted in their at-
tempts to assert responsibility or who have been intentionally denied
knowledge of their child's existence deserve more protection than those
who are simply not interested.288 These unaddressed issues leave states
guessing as to whose rights ultimately deserve protection.
C. Do Children Have a Constitutionally Protected Liberty Interest in
Their Psychological Families?
Another question the Supreme Court has left unanswered is whether
the child has a protected liberty interest in the adoptive family relation-
ship.289 The Court has recognized that children, as well as parents, have
substantive due process interests in certain aspects of their family life.290
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in Santosky v. Kramer,29 stated
that a child has "an interest in a normal homelife," '292 as "[a] stable, loving
homelife is essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-
being." '293 He expressed the view that children thus have countervailing
287. This situation raises the issue of whether an unwed father is constitutionally entitled to
notification of his child's existence. See Hamilton, supra note 278, at 952. Arguments against
protecting the unwed father's right to know of his child's existence focus on the right to privacy
and the mother's fundamental right to make abortion decisions. Id. at 988-91.
288. This Comment suggests which fathers should be notified, as well as whose consent
should be required. See infra notes 350-67 and accompanying text.
289. The Michigan Supreme Court denied that such a relationship deserves protection in In re
Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 663 (Mich. 1993). Jessica's next friend asserted that Jessica
had a liberty interest with the DeBoers which the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment should protect. Id. at 665. Her next friend based the argument on cases
such as In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which support the
proposition that children are "persons" under the Constitution. Id.
290. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
291. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
292. Id. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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interests in termination of parental rights proceedings. 294 Furthermore, the
Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families295 recognized that
[a]t least where the child has been placed in foster care as an
infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained
continuously for several years in the care of the same foster par-
ents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same place
in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same so-
cializing functions as a natural family.296
The same is true of a prospective adoptive family unit. Prospective
adopting parents who have lived with their children for a significant amount
of time fulfill the same role as biological parents in their "custody, care, and
nurture."297 But while recognizing that children may form emotional and
psychological bonds with individuals other than their biological parents, the
Court has been reluctant to recognize liberty interests outside of the tradi-
tional unitary family.298
Ironically, this steadfast adherence to the tradition of the nuclear fam-
ily has even led the Court to sever the psychological tie between a child and
her biological father. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court emphasized
limitations on the rights of minors independently to assert their interests
regarding their custody and care.2 99 The Court declined to decide whether
the child had a liberty interest in maintaining a filial relationship with either
her putative father, or with both her putative father and her mother's hus-
band.3" The Court found that even if such an interest were assumed, the
State had no obligation to recognize a right-the right of multiple father-
hood-which lacked support in history or tradition.3° '
What the Court seems to ignore is that the state, as parens patriae, has
traditionally protected children from abuse and neglect.30 2 The Court does
294. Id. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[The child's interest in a continuation of the family unit exists only to the extent that
such a continuation would not be harmful to him. An error in the factfinding hearing
that results in a failure to terminate a parent-child relationship which rightfully should
be terminated may well detrimentally affect the child.
Id. at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
295. 431 U.S. 158 (1977).
296. Id. at 844.
297. Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
298. See, e.g., supra notes 193, 225 and accompanying text.
299. 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989).
300. Id. at 130.
301. Id. at 130-31; see Kisthardt, supra note 149, at 612-13.
302. See DAvis & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 189; cf GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 250, at
4 (stating that while the law has "recognized the necessity of protecting a child's physical well-
being[,] ... [decision-makers] have been slow to understand and to acknowledge the necessity of
safeguarding a child's psychological well-being"). A child's liberty interest in maintaining famil-
ial bonds with prospective adoptive parents is not tantamount to an interest in choosing one family
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not seem ready, however, to protect the child from the psychological abuse
that accompanies being severed from the individuals she knows as family.
Rather than entering new territory, the Court clings to the principles of
parenthood originally used to favor biology over other forms of attachment,
and favoring the unitary family when it includes at least one biological par-
ent. By failing to recognize a liberty interest in children's relationships
with parents other than biological parents, courts easily may deny children
standing in proceedings directly affecting their lives. If the courts would
recognize a child's right to family privacy or autonomy as being separate
from the rights of the child's parents, the child's interests would never be
ignored.
V. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING CUSTODY IN DISPUTES BETWEEN
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS AND THIRD PARTIES
With the nature of the rights of parents in the third-party adoption con-
text unclear, a child's fate often depends upon the state's interpretation of
constitutional doctrine in enacting custody statutes. In custody disputes be-
tween natural parents, courts almost always base their decisions on the wel-
fare of the child.3"3 Historical preferences for either the mother"° or the
father305 have given way to an emphasis on placing the child with the par-
ent who will best serve the child's interests.30 6 In custody disputes involv-
ing biological parents and third parties, however, states are divided on the
standard to apply. Many courts give almost decisive weight to the natural
parent's interest.30 7 This emphasis on the natural parent's right to custody
over another. This Comment does not suggest that children should have a right to opt out of their
biological families simply because they are unhappy with the arrangement.
303. E.g., Linda Whobrey Rohman et al., The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes,
in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 62 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
304. See supra note 67; see also Melissa M. Wyer et al., The Legal Context of Child Custody
Evaluations, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DmmERMINATIONS 8 (Lois A. Weithom ed.,
1987) (stating that the doctrine has declined, although the maternal preference may be considered
as a "tie breaker" or as a factor in the decision).
305. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
306. Wyer et al., supra note 304, at 8-9. "Generally neither parent is now presumed to have a
superior right to the child. Rather, the prevalent standard requires a determination of what will
most effectively enhance the growth and development of the child from a physical, emotional, and
moral standpoint." Id. at 8. In determining what is in the child's best interests, courts may con-
sider a variety of factors, but most state statutes fall either to provide specific criteria or to specify
how to evaluate or weigh each criterion. Id. at 8-9. Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, which has served as a guideline for many courts, states that the court shall consider
relevant factors such as the wishes of the parents, wishes of the child, and interaction and interre-
lationship with parents and siblings. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DivoRCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 35
(1987). One of the most detailed statutes describing criteria for determining best interests is
Michigan's. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 722.22-.27 (West 1992).
307. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 527; see also infra notes 311-20 and accompanying text. An-
other consideration in biological parent-third party custody disputes is whether or not the third
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is predicated on the constitutional protection of the parent-child relation-
ship,308 which is rooted not only in natural law, but also in traditional no-
tions that natural parents are more successful in caring for their children
than third parties and that the emotional ties between natural parents and
their children deserve respect.309 Translating these assumptions into legal
standards has led to diversity in courts' treatment of such custody
disputes.310
party has standing under the statute. Without standing, the third party cannot bring the custody
action or intervene in it. State statutes vary as to when third parties have standing; some statutes
exclude even those who have a relationship with the child or significant interest in the child's
welfare. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 526-27; see UNU. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 401(d), 9A
U.L.A. 549-50 (1987).
308. See 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 532 ("The parental right doctrine has acquired rigidity
from the dubious and amorphous principle that the natural parent has some sort of constitutional
'right' to the custody of his child."); see also supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text. Clark
also notes that the parental rights doctrine antedated the Supreme Court cases that based the right
on constitutional grounds. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 527.
309. Cf. Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29
RurGERs L. REv. 1117, 1124 n.28 (1976) (stating that "[tihe assumptions underlying the parental
right doctrine are not always clear[, as s]ome decisions appear to demonstrate a belief that none
can love the child as well as the natural parent, while others seem to adopt the old view that
children are the property of their parents"). But see GoLDsTEIN ET AL., supra note 250, at 17
(noting that while "[bliological parents are credited with an invariable, instinctively based posi-
tive tie" to their children, they are often the child's source of abuse or neglect).
310. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 529. Generally, the courts are split between a parental rights
standard and a best interests of the child standard; however, the variations in these standards form
a continuum, as opposed to a dividing line, between the two standards. See Sandra R. Blair,
Jurisdiction, Standing, and Decisional Standards in Parent-Nonparent Custody Disputes, 58
WASH. L. Rv. 111, 115 (1982). Determining which standards each state uses is beyond the scope
of this Comment. The courts' differing approaches to the statutory language make it difficult to
discern what a statute actually means. See McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 214-15 n.24:
An accurate evaluation of the total number of jurisdictions subscribing to each standard
is... difficult to achieve. A definitive count would require a full tracking of the cus-
tody law of every jurisdiction .... A lesser inquiry would be inadequate and possibly
misleading since some courts have never been presented with the case which forces a
choice between the two standards; other courts have been presented the case too infre-
quently to indicate a prevailing view.... Some jurisdictions have so defined the stan-
dards that there is really little distinction between them; some have discussed the cases
in terms of the best interests of a child while actually applying the parental rights doc-
trine; still others have vacillated between the standards.
Id. (citations omitted); see also O'Keefe, supra note 147, at 1091-92 (exemplifying the discrepan-
cies even within states). One commentator examines the history of the parental rights standard in
Arkansas, for example, and finds that courts have relied on past decisions using the standard rather
than articulating a reason for its use. Id. at 1091-93. He notes that one of the oldest primarily
cited cases dates to 1881 and, although the court used parental rights language, the decision was in
favor of the third party based on exceptional circumstances, or child welfare grounds. Id. (citing
Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27 (1881)).
Some commentators have undertaken the task of categorizing the states by standard. See,
e.g., Haynie, supra note 85, at 706-26 (discussing presumption standards, a parental rights stan-
dard, and a best interests standard); Stephanie H. Smith, Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biologi-
cal Parents: The Courts' Response to New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J.
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In parental rights jurisdictions, courts rely on the traditional notion that
biological parents have natural rights concerning their children and will act
in the child's best interests.311 The parental rights standard requires that,
absent a showing of unfitness, the biological parent be awarded custody
over a third party.312 Only if the natural parents are found unfit will the
courts consider the best interests of the child before entering a custody or-
der. Because the standard of proof for showing unfitness is stringent,3 13 the
natural parents in these jurisdictions usually win custody of the child re-
gardless of whether the arrangement is in the child's best interests.3" 4
While several jurisdictions apply a pure parental rights standard,315
others use some variation of the standard, based on presumptions of paren-
tal preference.31 6 Some of these jurisdictions defer to natural parents'
FAM. L. 545, 547-52 (1978-79) (focusing on case law to avoid the vague statutes and categorizing
each state as either a parental rights, intermediate, or child-focused jurisdiction).
311. See Haynie, supra note 85, at 708-09 & n.13. Ms. Haynie argues that parents' rights are
the paramount consideration, as "biological parents have a natural right to the care and custody of
their children which cannot be overcome absent a clear and unequivocal showing of unfitness,
voluntary relinquishment, or abandonment." Id. at 708-09.
312. See NEw TRENDS, supra note 67, at 21.
The prevailing law on child custody mirrors contemporary values shared by the public,
although there is usually a lag before the law catches up with social change. For exam-
ple, the court's decision on what constitutes a 'fit' or 'unfit' parent depends largely upon
whether or not there is consensus on parental obligations and norms of behavior.
Id.
313. See, e.g., In the Interest of C.T.L., 357 S.E.2d 298, 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring
"clear and convincing evidence"); State ex rel. Olson v. Sorenson, 293 N.W. 241, 242 (Minn.
1940) (requiring "satisfactory proof"); Szemler v. Clements, 202 S.E.2d 880, 884 (Va. 1974)
(requiring "clear, cogent and convincing evidence").
314. Often, the courts' rationale is that living with fit biological parents is in the best interests
of the child. See Haynie, supra note 85, at 709.
315. See id. at 708-09 n.12 (listing seven states that "clearly" apply the standard-Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia-and one that continues to use
the language-Mississippi). One jurisdiction has even held that consideration of the child's best
interests is unconstitutional. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Kan. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (holding a new Kansas statute establishing a "best interests" standard
unconstitutional). The court reasoned that Quilloin, which upheld the constitutionality of best
interest hearings, was a narrow holding that did not apply in this case. Id. at 1126-27. The court
found that the previous Supreme Court decisions, as well as legislative intent, made awarding the
child to a third party unconstitutional even when a biological parent is unfit. Id. at 1127.
316. One commentator divides the intermediate states into three categories: states applying a
"fitness presumption" standard, a "convincing presumption" standard, and a "disappearing pre-
sumption" standard. See Haynie, supra note 85, at 711-21. According to Haynie's research, the
fitness presumption standard is followed in six states-Alaska, Indiana, New Mexico, Wisconsin,
Arkansas, and Utah. Id. at 712. The article further distinguishes among these six: The first three
are strict fitness presumption jurisdictions; the next one is slightly different; and the last two are
"preponderance of the evidence" jurisdictions, as opposed to "clear and convincing evidence"
jurisdictions. Id. at n.25. Furthermore, 12 states apply the "convincing presumption" standard, in
which the third party must show by clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interests
dictate nonparental custody. Id. at 715-18. This places a heavy burden on the third party. Id. at
716. In the "disappearing" standard states, courts retain the parental presumption language, but
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rights by establishing a rebuttable presumption that the biological parent
will best serve the child's welfare.317 Others hold that the natural parents
should prevail, barring a detrimental effect on the child318 or "extraordinary
circumstances"3"9 that require awarding custody to a third party.
320
In contrast to this presumptive framework, other jurisdictions apply a
more discretionary standard-the "best interests of the child" standard.
321
In pure "best interests" jurisdictions, the child's welfare is paramount to any
other consideration.322 The best interests standard allows the court to con-
sider a number of factors, including the physical, emotional, and psycholog-
ical well-being of the child.3 23 Jurisdictions that apply the best interests
standard often place considerable weight on the "psychological parent" doc-
trine in adjudicating custody disputes between biological parents and third
focus on the interests of the child. Id at 718-21. Haynie notes that "[w]hile the burden of proof
remains on the nonparent, it is not difficult to meet. Once the nonparent comes forth with any
evidence, the presumption disappears, and the nonparent must prove only by a preponderance of
the evidence that" awarding the child to him serves the child's best interests. Id. at 719-20.
317. See 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 531 n.44 (listing cases applying the presumption).
318. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3040(a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring custody to be
granted "according to the best interest of the child," with preference given to the natural parents
above all other persons).
319. Among the factors courts consider are:
why parent and child were separated, how long they were separated, whether a substi-
tute relationship developed, and why the parent now seeks resumption of the original
relationship. In situations where a parent has voluntarily surrendered custody, where
there has been prolonged separation, and where "an entirely new" parent-child relation-
ship has been created, intermediate jurisdictions are far more reluctant to disturb the
child's status quo.
Smith, supra note 310, at 550; see also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1976)
(holding that the child's eight-year period of living with an unrelated, older woman and separation
from parents constituted "extraordinary circumstances"); Blair, supra note 310, at 117 (also
describing circumstances courts consider "extraordinary").
320. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 531 & n.46. One student commentator places the rebuttable
presumption closer to the parental rights end of the continuum and the extraordinary circum-
stances exception closer to the best interests side because of "[tihese courts' recognition of the
importance of continuity for a child and their overall focus on the child's welfare.' Blair, supra
note 310, at 117-18. Clark considers both to be a form of the best interests standard. See 2
CLARK, supra note 8, at 531.
321. Compare Haynie, supra note 85, at 721 (stating that there are 10 states that apply this
standard) with Smith, supra note 310, at 550-551 (stating that eight jurisdictions are child-fo-
cused). See also 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 530 n.39 (listing cases in jurisdictions applying a best
interests standard).
322. 2 CLARK, supra note 8, at 530-32. "[T]he best interests standard is based on the recogni-
tion that there is no analogy between a custody award and a decision concerning the title to
property." Id. at 532.
323. See McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 213; see also McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d
176, 182-85 (Conn. 1984) (awarding custody to the child's maternal grandmother when a substan-
tial emotional relationship was shown), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
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parties.3 24  As articulated in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,3" a
leading work on psychological parentage, the psychological parent is the
adult who, "on a continuing day-to-day basis through interaction, compan-
ionship, interplay and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for
a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." '326 The psychological parent
theory is based on the social sciences,327 which focus on the child's needs
and the damaging effect of separation from the parental figure, regardless of
any biological connection.328 Even before this theory gained acceptance,
courts had used the idea of psychological parentage in custody determina-
tions.329 The application of this doctrine is inconsistent, however, and fur-
ther widens the disparity among states in making custody decisions.
324. Blair, supra note 310, at 116-18. For lists of cases allowing and disallowing the psycho-
logical parent to retain custody, see ANN M. HARALAMBME, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 157
n.20 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
325. GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 250.
326. lId at 98.
327. Some commentators have criticized the use of such data in custody determinations, See,
e.g., Phoebe Ellsworth & Robert Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An
Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc'y REv. 167,
198-99 (1969) (finding that "psychological research that can be considered both relevant and
useful to the problems of custody adjudication is minimal.... [and that] judgments based upon
the psychological tests of either the parents or the child are not likely to be well founded");
Okpaku, supra note 309, at 1144-45 (stating that "psychological hypotheses are sufficiently elastic
to be pressed into the service of virtually any opinion or prediction," and thus should not be used),
Others, however, have strongly supported the use of psychological and social science data in this
area. See, e.g., Rohman et al., supra note 303, at 59, 59-61 (stating that the use of social sciences,
psychology in particular, in child custody determinations is valuable because (1) direct studies
show their usefulness, (2) judges will be prevented from misusing the data by practical and proce-
dural rules, and (3) the speculative nature of the data may be acknowledged).
328. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 250, at 12 ("Unlike adults, children have no psycho-
logical conception of relationship by blood-tie until quite late in their development.").
329. NEw TRENDS, supra note 67, at 27; see, e.g., In re Catherine S. and Darlene S., 74 Misc.
2d 154, 158-59 (Fam. Ct. 1973); In re Mittenthal, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 509 (Fam. Ct. 1962). In
Mittenthal, the court denied a mother custody of a 16-year-old, even though she had been deemed
competent after spending four years in a mental hospital. Id. at 502-03. The son, during this
period, had thrived in foster care and showed improvement in school and in his social adjustment.
Id. at 509. The case is significant because, at the time of the decision, there was no clear statutory
basis for withholding custody from the mother, and because the court held that, upon her recovery,
she was not an unfit parent in the usual sense. Id. at 511-12. Instead, the mental health of the son
and his psychological best interests were the basis for the decision. Id. at 509. If the jurisdiction
had been a parental-rights doctrine jurisdiction, the court would have reached the opposite result.
For favorable reviews of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, see Henry H. Foster, Jr., A
Review of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 2 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHOL. & LAW 46
(1974), reprinted in 12 WrLLAMrrE L. Rav. 545 (1976), and Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B.
Strauss, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 74 COLUM. L. Rv. 996 (1974).
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VI. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS AND INCONSISTENCIES IN ADOPTION
AND CUSTODY LAW
In light of different adoption statutes, 330 various standards for custody
determinations, 33t and the uncertain constitutional status of some of the par-
ties, 3 32 courts are deciding similar issues in inconsistent ways. 333 As a re-
sult, adoptive parents are scared, and children are again being treated like
property. Although children are most often the real parties in interest, they
are incapable of fighting for their rights or expressing their preferences.
The adults are thus the ones who fight for the child. The struggle, however,
inevitably becomes one over who deserves the child, or who has the
"rights" to this human being. Ultimately, the child, whose interests are
often ignored, is the one who suffers the most. To ensure that the child is
not treated as property, states should enact laws that encourage responsibil-
ity, rather than those that focus primarily on who has a right to the child.
A. Uniform Changes in Adoption Laws
The publicity surrounding recent custody decisions involving biologi-
cal parents and third parties has sparked a demand for adoption reform at
the state level.334 Some state legislatures have already begun modifying
their adoption laws to avoid conflicts like Baby Jessica's. 33 5 Because the
federal government is reluctant to legislate on intimate family issues, each
state has the freedom to enact adoption statutes that reflect its individual
public policy. Consequently, adoption laws vary across state lines. 336 This
diversity leads to confusion and often works against the child's best inter-
330. See supra note 8.
331. See supra notes 307-29 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 232-301 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 23-56 and accompanying text.
334. See Nancy E. Roman, Jessica Case Prompts Adoption-Reform Rush, WASH. Tasas, Aug.
7, 1993, at Al. Commentators have also urged that reforms are necessary at both the state and
federal level in other areas, such as access to records and race-matching statutes. See, e.g., Miller,
supra note 7, at 797-807.
335. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 23 ('The Michigan legislature, having come under increasing
pressure with each ruling against the DeBoers, is considering altering state laws to weigh chil-
dren's interests more heavily."); House Panel Endorses Measure to Prevent 'Baby Jessica' Cases,
ARIz. REPUBLmC, Feb. 3, 1994, at B2 (discussing a bill that would require birth mothers to list all
potential birth fathers and would give unwed fathers 30 days to respond to notice of the adoption);
Nancy Weaver, Adoptive Families Fear Losing Kids Despite Reform Plans, SACRAMENTO BEn,
Sept. 17, 1993, at Bi (discussing adoption reforms in progress in California).
336. For example, while some states require the mother to wait at least 72 hours after the
child's birth before signing papers relinquishing her parental rights, see, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT.
Am. § 8-107 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1007(b) (1993); Nsv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.070(1)
(Michie 1993); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.08 (Anderson 1989), other states require at least 5
days, see, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). Some states do
not have any restrictions on when consent may be given. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-13
(1992) (at any time); IDAHO CODE § 16-1504 (Supp. 1993) (does not specify); N.C. GEN STAT.
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ests. One possible solution to this inconsistency is the adoption of uniform
laws. A carefully designed uniform act that considers the interests of the
biological parents, the adoptive parents, and, above all, the child would not
only lead to clearer, more systematic laws across state lines, but would also
clarify the parties' rights and responsibilities. 337 A uniform act may thus
have "as its consequence an advancement of individual freedom. 338 In
response to the problems faced in adoption contests, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is drafting such an act-a
new Uniform Adoption Act (the Proposed Act)339-which proposes to clar-
ify the rights of the parties, streamline procedures, and protect the child's
interests at each stage of the adoption.340
The initial step in creating uniform adoption laws is to modify existing
laws to promote the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of
the child.34' The states' first concern in the adoption process is the
mother's decision to surrender her child. Because of the importance of this
decision and its emotional impact on the mother,342 states have an interest
§ 48-7 (1991) (same); see also NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 76-
85 (1985) (listing all 50 states and their various adoption requirements).
337. "By its nature, a uniform act, if accepted substantially intact by all states, would elimi-
nate most of the legal conflicts that so often plague adoption proceedings across state lines."
Images of Adoption-and of Confusion, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1993, at B3. For an in-depth discus-
sion of the positive effect of uniform laws, especially in the family law context, see Stein, supra
note 74, at 1102.
338. Stein, supra note 74, at 1102.
339. UNi. ADOPTION Acr (Proposed Draft 1993). This Comment uses the draft of the Act
that was released "for discussion only."
340. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws "is a body of some
approximately 300 lawyers, judges, and law professors representing the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands." James H. Andrews, Clarifying the Babel of
Adoption Laws, CHRISTIAN SC. MONrrOR, Aug. 16, 1993, at 13. During the past century, they
have drafted more than 200 proposed statutes on a wide range of legal matters. Id. The commit-
tee working on the adoption act includes three judges, lawyers with family law experience, and
other lawyers with experience in legislative drafting. Id. The Act, which was initially drafted in
1951, is expected to be completed in August of 1994. Id. This Comment presents relevant parts
of the Proposed Act and makes further suggestions.
341. Promoting the child's best interests is the goal of adoption statutes. See, e.g., Aiuz. RPv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (1956 & Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304 (1989); MD. FAM. LAW
CODE Aim. § 5-311 (1991 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (Michie 1950 & Supp.
1993). For a list of various public policy considerations in enacting adoption laws, see Hamilton,
supra note 278, at 992-93.
342. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1818-
19 & n.19 (1988) (describing the emotional trauma that leads surrogate mothers to break their
contracts). Jackson notes that
giving up a child can be, for some birth mothers, a far more painful and terrible event
than they might have reasonably foreseen prior to conception-a severing of an emo-
tional bond whose power and force cannot be recognized fully before the coming into
being of the child as a person.
Id. at 1819 n.19.
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in regulating the time and manner in which a mother may relinquish her
parental rights.343 Statutes must strike a balance between the need to ensure
that the mother has made an informed and voluntary choice and the need to
place the child as soon as possible. 3 " The Proposed Act suggests that the
birth mother should not sign the consent forms until after the baby is
born34 and that she should be notified of the availability of legal and per-
sonal counseling prior to her decision.346  These provisions aim to prepare
the mother for the emotional impact of giving birth and relinquishing the
child while safeguarding both mother and child from hasty decisions. An
even stronger protection is to require that the mother have counseling
before giving up the child.34 7 With mandatory legal and psychological
counseling, birth mothers would be better prepared both to make the deci-
sion and to understand the emotional and legal consequences of relinquish-
ing a child for adoption.
States must also limit the length of time during which a mother may
revoke her consent. The Proposed Act provides that she be allowed to re-
voke her consent within 120 hours of the child's birth if she executes such
consent within that same period.348 This scheme gives the mother enough
time to recover from delivery and to be as certain as possible that the adop-
tion is in her and the child's best interests. This time limit for revoking
consent or relinquishment is short enough that risk of harm to the child is
minimal, even if the child is placed the day after birth.349
343. See supra note 336.
344. The earlier the placement, the more easily the child will adapt to the new family and the
separation from the biological mother.
345. UNin. ADoPTIoN AcT § 2-404(a) (Proposed Draft 1993).
346. Id. § 2-404(e).
347. An inherent problem with this suggestion is the feasibility and enforcement of such a
requirement.
348. UNIF. ADOMON Acr § 2-404(a) (Proposed Draft 1993). This gives the mother approxi-
mately five days after the birth to change her mind. Consent given after this time would presuma-
bly be irrevocable under the Act. See id. While some state statutes give the mother a certain
number of days to change her mind, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11(a)(3) (Michie 1993) (30
days from time of giving consent), limiting the time in hours is more efficient and leaves less
room for confusion. In addition, states that give birth mothers long periods of time to revoke their
consent, see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.070(b) (1993) (any time before entering of adoption
decree), leave mothers to contemplate their decision on a daily basis, or feel increased guilt or
remorse if they do not.
The Proposed Act also requires that the mother (or other parent or guardian) give consent or
relinquish her parental rights in front of a judge, UNIF. AooPrioN Acr § 2-405(a)(1) (Proposed
Draft 1993), public officer appointed by a judge, id. § 2-405(a)(2), or lawyer not representing the
prospective adoptive parent, id. § 2-405(a)(4), to avoid undue pressure, as well as appreciate the
finality of the decision.
349. Unfortunately, this does not compensate the prospective adoptive parents for their disap-
pointment in not keeping the child.
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A more difficult reform in adoption law involves how to treat the un-
wed father and, more specifically, whether courts should give notice to or
require consent from unwed fathers who either (1) do not know of their
child's existence, (2) did not know of their child's existence until birth, or
(3) were thwarted by the mother in their efforts to establish a relationship
with the child.350 The Proposed Act requires courts to notify those unwed
fathers who have either acknowledged paternity, or who have been judi-
cially determined to be the father and have shown responsibility for and
interest in the child.351 The Act also places a limit of thirty days on the
father's time to respond to notice of the adoption proceeding.352 These pro-
posals ensure that fathers who have at least acknowledged some responsi-
bility for their children will be afforded limited due process.
The Proposed Act further suggests that when the father's location is
unknown, the court should make a good faith inquiry into his wherea-
bouts.353 If these efforts are unsuccessful, the court should attempt to notify
him of the proceedings by publishing or posting such notice, whichever is
most likely to lead to actual notice.3 54 While some who propose adoption
law reform urge that mothers be required to name possible fathers,355 others
suggest that she not be compelled, but rather "advised that the proceeding
for adoption may be delayed or dismissed if a possible father is not given
350. Section 2-401(a)(1)(i) does not address the father who is married to the mother or was
married to the mother at the time of the child's birth, as he, like the mother, is clearly required to
give his consent to the adoption. Biological fathers who have legitimated their children by mar-
rying the mother have established protected liberty interests in these relationships.
351. UNiF. ADOPION ACr § 2-401(a)(1)(iii)(A) (Proposed Draft 1993). This section suggests
that the father must have provided, "in accordance with his financial means, reasonable and con-
sistent payments for the support of the minor and ha[ve] regularly visited or communicated with
the minor." Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 110, at 325 (supporting such a rule and noting that
such rules "should be based upon society's understanding of relationship and responsibility, rather
than on what seems fair to the parents"); DeMarco, supra note 267, at 293-94 (proposing that
adoption and custody statutes "be drafted to protect only those putative fathers entitled to constitu-
tional safeguards by virtue of their psychological parenthood status").
352. UNwT. ADOPTION Acr § 2-402(a)(7) (Proposed Draft 1993). Although such time limits
may appear arbitrary, this limit seems reasonably calculated to afford the father due process with-
out jeopardizing the child's welfare. A father who is truly interested in blocking the adoption or
obtaining custody should not need more time to decide. The 30-day limit is actually an extension
of the nine-month period he already had to contemplate his paternity. A 30-day limit has already
gained support. See In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 11. App. LEXIS 1271, at *55 (Aug. 18, 1993)
(Tully, J., dissenting), appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (Il. 1993); House Panel Endorses Mea-
sure to Prevent 'Baby Jessica' Cases, supra note 338, at B2.
353. UNi. ADOPTION Acr § 3-404 (Proposed Draft 1993).
354. Id. § 3-404(d); see also Hill, supra note 276, at 958-60 (stating that publishing notice in a
discrete manner would minimize the infringement on the mother's privacy).
355. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 276, at 958-59. One commentator proposes that state statutes
should place the burden of identifying the father on the mother and recommends that "statutes...
go beyond current Supreme Court doctrine and include provisions which strengthen the putative
father's position in hearings held to terminate his parental rights." Id. at 962.
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notice of the proceeding." 356 Some states have gone so far as to establish
putative father registries, which require a man who suspects he has impreg-
nated a woman to register his name with the state to ensure notification of
adoption proceedings.357 Because privacy and practicality issues may pre-
clude the effectiveness of both putative father registries and compelled dis-
closure,35 8 state statutes should require that mothers be encouraged to
disclose the names of possible fathers and be warned of the consequences
of failing to notify them of the proceedings.359
State statutes must also consider which unwed fathers must consent to
an adoption. Clearly, those fathers who have established paternity within
the given time limit and who have formed a substantial relationship with the
child should have to consent to the proceeding that terminates their parental
rights.360 Unwed fathers who know of the mother's pregnancy and, upon
learning of the adoption, attempt to assert paternity rights, but show no
significant signs of responsibility toward the child, should not be required
356. UNw. ADOPTION ACT § 3-404(e) (Proposed Draft 1993).
357. See, e.g., ARK. CODE Am. § 9-9-210 (Michie 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9 (Michie
1992); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (1992); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN § 9:400 (West 1992); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 192.016 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 321-5-20 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 111-9 (MeKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1 (West 1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-111 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (1992). For a discussion of the
benefits of establishing putative father registries to protect unwed fathers' rights, see Alexandra R.
Dapolito, Comment, The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: Balancing
the Adoption Equation, 42 CATH. U. L. Rnv. 979, 1021-26 (1993).
358. See Hamilton, supra note 278, at 999; Bartlett, supra note 110, at 320-21. Mothers may
have different reasons for refusing to disclose the father's name. While some mothers consider
the welfare of the child paramount and fear that the child will be harmed by living with the father,
others base their decisions on more self-serving reasons and withhold the father's name for more
spiteful purposes. Bartlett, supra note 110, at 323-24. Bartlett suggests that courts should con-
sider the mother's reasons, as well as the father's, for seeking to block the adoption. Id. at 324-25.
She proposes a standard that would allow courts to presume that the mother's relationship with the
child makes her decision to place the child for adoption responsible and requires the father to
overcome the presumption "with evidence that his plan to keep the child is more responsible." Id.
at 325. She adds that "[clonvincing and realistic plans for providing adequately for the child
would be relevant evidence, as would evidence about his attitude toward the mother's pregnancy."
Id.
359. A mother should be advised that failure to disclose the father's name may result in harm
to the child if he later appears to contest the adoption. A mother who is concerned about opposi-
tion from a man she assumes is unfit to raise her child would still have to rely on the courts to
determine the best placement for the child. Generally, for any of the proposals to be effective, all
of the parties will have to act responsibly. For an insightful evaluation of competing claims
between parents in the adoption context and the need for responsibility-based standards for recon-
ciling them, see Bartlett, supra note 110, at 315-26.
360. The Proposed Act protects fathers, and encourages responsibility on their part, by requir-
ing consent from those unwed fathers who (1) have acknowledged paternity (or have been judi-
cially determined to be the father) and have provided "regular and consistent payments for support
of the minor" to the best of their ability, or (2) have received the child into their home and openly
held the child out to be their own. UNw. ADOPTION AT § 2-401(a)(iii)-(iv) (Proposed Draft
1993).
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to consent.361 The Proposed Act makes strong suggestions for when the
parental rights of these unwed fathers should be terminated in the first six
months of an infant's life. The Act proposes that courts should terminate the
parental rights of fathers who, without good cause and with reason to know
of the birth or expected birth, failed to (1) provide "reasonable prenatal,
natal, and postnatal expenses in accordance with his... financial means,"
(2) "make reasonable and consistent payments ... for the support of the
minor," (3) "visit with the minor," and (4) "manifest an ability and willing-
ness to assume legal and physical custody of the minor."362 This sugges-
tion also ensures that a father who has shown a commitment to fatherhood
even before the child's birth will be protected.
The Act also makes detailed and insightful proposals for addressing
the termination-or preservation-of parental rights of a father who has,
for good cause, failed promptly to respond to notice.363 Courts should ter-
minate his parental rights only if there is clear and convincing evidence
that: (1) the father is unwilling or unable to seek custody and support the
child; (2) he is unwilling or unable to maintain contact with the child and
provide support; (3) placing the child in his "legal and physical custody
would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological well-
being of the minor ... ; or (4) failure to terminate would be detrimental to
the minor.' '3 4 Factors the court "shall" consider in determining whether
failure to terminate would be detrimental to the child include:
the respondent's efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical
custody of the minor, the respondent's ability to pay for the mi-
nor's support, the age of the minor, the quality of any previous
relationship between the respondent and the minor and between
the respondent and any other minor children, the duration and
suitability of the minor's present custodial environment, the effect
of a change of physical custody on the minor, and any recommen-
dation of the minor's guardian ad litem. 365
This comprehensive list of factors presents courts with a well-articulated set
of guidelines to follow when deciding the fate of the father, prospective
adoptive parents, and the child. By focusing on protecting the child from
physical or psychological harm, courts would avoid some of the discretion-
ary problems inherent in determining the child's "best interests." At the
361. See id. § 3-704(a)(1); see also supra note 179.
362. UNIF. ADOPTIoN Acr § 3-704(a)(1) (Proposed Draft 1993).
363. This section addresses the rights of fathers who then attempt to establish paternal rights.
For a discussion of the termination of the parental rights of fathers who never appear, see infra
text accompanying notes 366-67.
364. UNm. ADOPnON Acr § 3-704(b)(1)-(4) (Proposed Draft 1993).
365. Id. § 3-704(b)(4).
1326 [Vol. 72
1994] ADOPTION DISPUTES & BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
same time, courts would not be permitted to ignore the psychological ef-
fects of taking a child from a loving family.
As a final consideration to unwed fathers and their children, states
must determine how to treat the absent father. The court should terminate
the parental rights of the unknown father or the father who fails to appear
after having been served notice. 366 If the father can show that he has not
received notice because of fraud or bad faith, however, courts should con-
sider the totality of the circumstances in making a decision that would cause
the least harm to the child.367
Another necessary reform involves expediting the procedures for
resolving adoption proceedings and custody disputes.368 Often the proceed-
ings, which can take years, exacerbate the problem by allowing a child to
remain with prospective adoptive parents long enough to establish a psy-
chological bond. Although the Proposed Act states that the prospective
adoptive parents are entitled to custody pending the final decree of adoption
"[u]nless the court orders otherwise to protect the welfare of the minor, ' 369
other commentators propose that courts should grant custody to a biological
father who has manifested some responsibility toward his child while his
rights are being adjudicated.37° Statutes should grant custody to the pro-
spective adoptive parents, who otherwise may never be able to gain custody
of the child. Either way, the longer the child lives with any parental figure,
the more dangerous the separation will be to the child. 37 1 States should
therefore limit the time for filing and hearing an appeal to a decree of adop-
tion.372 The goals of providing stability for children and protecting their
well being require expedient adjudication in adoption (and custody) pro-
366. Id. § 3-704(c).
367. Cf. Hill, supra note 276, at 960:
If it is brought to the court's attention shortly after placement, rescission of the petition
may be the best solution. However, it is more likely that despite fraud, the adoption
should remain final given the state's interest in securing permanent placements and in
protecting the emotional and psychological well-being of the child. This decision
should be based on an ad-hoe analysis of the facts surrounding each individual case so
as to achieve the best balance between the competing interests.
Another suggestion is that states allow the father to assert an affirmative defense for not
establishing his rights within the prescribed period. In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 Ill. App.
LEXIS 1271, at *55 (Aug. 18, 1993) (Tully, J., dissenting), appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (Ill.
1993). This grace period would not extend past 120 days under any circumstance. Id. (Tully, J.,
dissenting).
368. See Zinman, supra note 274, at 998-1000.
369. See UNWR. ADovron Acr § 3-501 (Proposed Draft 1993).
370. See, e.g., Zinman, supra note 274, at 996-998.
371. See GOLDSThiN mT AL., supra note 250, at 40-42. "Three months may not be a long time
for an adult decisionmaker. For a young child it may be forever." Id. at 43.
372. The Act proposes that an appeal from an adoption decree "must be filed within [20] days
after the decree.., is entered, and the appeal must be heard expeditiously." UNnF. ADoPTIoN ACT
§ 3-807 (Proposed Draft 1993).
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ceedings.373 These same goals support the adoption of uniform laws that
not only protect the rights of the parties, but also encourage responsibility in
establishing families for children.
B. Change in Custody Law
Although enacting uniform adoption statutes may help prevent
problems from arising, even these reforms would not cover every fact situa-
tion. When adoption petitions are dismissed, the state courts bear the bur-
den of determining, pursuant to state statutes, who will receive custody of
the child. Courts apply different standards in custody disputes, however.374
Consequently, custody determinations are inconsistent across state lines and
may also be prolonged by concurrent adjudications. 375
Because courts often give the biological parent unwarranted prefer-
ence, scholars have criticized the parental rights standard as anachronis-
tic,376 unrealistic, 3 77 psychologically unsound, 378 and unconstitutional. 379
This preference fails to consider the needs, interests, and welfare of the
child; it also fails to consider that the definition of who may be a parent is
373. See In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 I11. App. LEXIS 1271, at *26-*27 (Aug. 18, 1993),
appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (Il1. 1993):
It is surely imperative that the judiciary have enough judges and proper judicial case
management in place at both the trial and appellate levels so that "time" does not be-
come a factor in the decisional process of a case. Every effort must be made to see that
we do not have any more cases ... where it takes two years and five months to deter-
mine the lawful parentage of a young child. Moreover, the judiciary must come to grips
with the fact that the psyche of our society can ill afford cases where children are
"switched" parents after the first 18 months of life.
374. See supra notes 307-29 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text. One alternative states may consider is
the establishment of a statutory scheme requiring mediation between the parties before going to
court. A neutral mediator would help the parties understand the consequences of their actions and
help them agree on a workable solution. Only after failing to resolve the dispute in mediation
would the parties seek legal action. The problem with this scheme, however, is that such a pro-
cess may actually exacerbate the problem by prolonging the custody decision.
376. McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 243 ("'The parental rights doctrine has become an
anachronism in light of current psychological knowledge. Since it appears that blood may not
necessarily be 'thicker than water,' the assumption that a child's best interests will be served by
his parents becomes meaningless.").
377. O'Keefe, supra note 147, at 1081. "Defining parenthood in terms of biology is no longer
practical or feasible. It would seem to make more sense to define parent in terms of the actual
relationship with a child." Id. at 1100.
378. McGough & Shindell, supra note 66, at 244.
379. Id. at 244 (stating that the doctrine "may be unconstitutional in light of th[e] language in
Smith"); see also Haynie, supra note 85, at 736-42. Haynie states that in light of the Supreme
Court's decisions in the unwed father cases, as well as in Moore and Smith, "all standards that
emphasize biology as the guiding principle for resolving third-party custody disputes are unconsti-
tutional," id. at 736, and "[o]nly a true best interests standard survives constitutional scrutiny," id.
at 742.
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not what it used to be.38 In light of the changes in the modem family,
courts must consider the child's welfare and the psychological effects of
custody decisions; the best interests standard is thus the better standard for
courts to use. Under the best interests approach, courts may consider any
factors relevant to a determination of what will best protect the child's wel-
fare. Because the standard is vague, however, it often gives judges almost
complete discretion "to make decisions that reflect their own subjective val-
ues."3' 1 A clearer enunciation of the factors judges should consider would
strengthen the effectiveness of the standard in preserving the child's
welfare.
The authors of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child propose a modi-
fication of the best interest standard based on the psychological parent doc-
trine. They suggest that courts apply a "least detrimental alternative"
standard in custody determinations. 382 This standard is founded on three
premises: Courts should always consider the child's need for perma-
nency,383 the child's sense of time,384 and the general inability to make
long-range predictions about the child's welfare.385
Courts should focus on the factors supporting the "least detrimental
alternative" standard, as well as those commonly considered "extraordinary
circumstances. 386 These factors should include the child's sense of time,
which differs with age, the child's attachment to the psychological parents,
the emotional trauma attributed to separation from such parents, and the
court's inability to predict what will ultimately be best for the child.387
Courts need to recognize that the child's world is different from the adult's
and then evaluate the child's sense of attachment, time, and stability in light
of this difference. They should not base custody decisions on the notion of
who deserves the child, but rather on what the child deserves.
Furthermore, state courts should recognize that even if an appellate
court upholds the dismissal of an adoption petition because termination of a
parent's rights is not warranted, the court should make a custody decision in
380. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
381. Laura A. Foggan, Note, Parents' Selection of Children's Surnames, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
Rnv. 583, 595 n.89 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Court has criticized the possibility of over-
broad interpretation by judges). Thus, judges who agree that living with biological parents is
always best for a child undermine the standard.
382. GoLDsTErN r AL., supra note 250, at 53.
383. Id. at 31-34.
384. Id. at 40-42.
385. Id. at 49-52.
386. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
387. See supra text accompanying note 365 for a more comprehensive list of factors that
courts should consider.
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light of the child's present situation. 88 Parents whose rights have not been
terminated should not automatically receive custody of the child. 8 9 Again,
the court should consider any "extraordinary circumstances" in determining
which placement would cause the least harm to the child. At the same time,
courts should also consider visitation rights. If the child remains with the
prospective adoptive parents and the father's rights are not terminated, he
may still have visitation rights and thus some ability to maintain a relation-
ship with the child .39  At the same time, if the father gains custody of the
child, courts should consider granting the prospective adoptive parents visi-
tation rights to ease the transition. 91 If all states consider the same factors
and emphasize children's rights and well-being, uniformity in custody laws
would complement a carefully designed adoption scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
The judge who ruled that Baby Richard should remain with the family
that raised him remarked:
Fortunately, the time has long past when children in our society
were considered the property of their parents. Slowly, but finally,
when it comes to children even the law has rid itself of the Dred
Scott mentality that a human being can be considered a piece of
property "belonging" to another human being.392
Yet two weeks before this decision, Baby Jessica was taken from her family
and transferred to the biological parents who were strangers to her. Ironi-
cally, in January of 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court granted Mr. Kirch-
ner's appeal,393 which may ultimately disrupt Baby Richard's family and
change his life.
Although the law recognizes that children have constitutionally pro-
tected rights in the family context, their rights are limited by the courts'
often steadfast reliance on history and tradition. Courts must, however,
388. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, A Failed System is Tearing Kids Apart, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 17.
389. A child is "not a misaddressed parcel that, once the error is discovered, should be shipped
to the correct recipient." Id.
390. See Bartlett, supra note 110, at 955-63. Bartlett supports allowing visitation rights by
noting that "[t]he availability of adoption without termination of parental rights could have
helped the children in both Quilloin v. Walcott and Caban v. Mohammed." Id. at 957. See supra
notes 57-62 and accompanying text for an example of a situation in which the prospective adop-
tive parents and biological father reached such an agreement without resorting to the courts.
391. Cf Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 655-62 (1984) (discussing the benefits of granting natural parents visitation
rights after their child is adopted).
392. In re Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1271, at *10-*11 (Aug. 18, 1993),
appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. 1993).
393. See supra note 56.
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evaluate their respect for tradition in light of changing societal values and
norms and balance such respect with the rights of those who will be af-
fected. In the family context, the law is capable of reflecting current prac-
tices while upholding traditional principles. The legal system needs to
realize that the "sanctity" of the family derives from the notion of the fam-
ily as "a continuing relationship of love and care, and an assumption of
responsibility for some other person." '39 4 Courts should thus focus on what
leads to the tradition-the role of the family in the "custody, care, and
nurture" of its members.395 In today's society, parenthood is no longer
solely a function of biology.
Only by recognizing and accepting the prevalence and importance of
nontraditional family relationships will the law be adequately prepared to
protect children's rights and welfare. Especially in the adoption context,
which purports to provide children with stable, loving home lives, states
should modify their laws so that they consistently foster parental responsi-
bility and emphasize children's rights. Birth mothers, biological fathers,
and prospective adoptive parents, as well as the states, should realize that as
they struggle over a decision, so does the child. A legal response to the
problems inherent in the adoption scheme may encourage biological and
psychological parents to act responsibly-perhaps even to provide for their
children without entangling them in a quagmire of judicial proceedings.
Only then will "Solomon's children" and the people who care for them be
able to rest more easily.
KIRSTEN KoRN
394. Lawrence A. Kanusher, Note, All in the Family: Succession Rights and Rent Stabilized
Apartments, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 213, 235 n.118 (1987).
395. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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